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WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 
COMMANDER C. C. GILL, U. S. NAVY 



WHAT HAPPENED 
AT JUTLAND 

THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE 



BY 

C. C. GILL 

COMMANDER, U. S. NAVY 
AUTHOR OF "naval POWBB IN THE WAB," ETC. 



WITH 26 DIAGRAMS 




NEW XBJr YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 






COPYRIGHT. 1921. 
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY ^ 



5^^'"^ 
^ 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



m -2 m\ 

g)CU608965 



FOREWORD 

This work of Commander Gill, U. S. Navy, 
is a thoughtful, painstaking and thorough re- 
search into all the evidence bearing upon the 
now historic battle of Jutland and constitutes 
a valuable contribution to the list of publica- 
tions upon the Art of War on the Sea. 

H. B. Wilson, 

Admiral U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, 

Atlantic Fleet. 

U.S.S. Permsylvama, 
Flagship. 



[V] 



PREFACE 

A GREAT deal has already been written about the 
battle of Jutland. The most recent contribution 
is a 600-page official record of the original English 
reports and despatches. The British have pre- 
sented their side of the battle — the Germans have 
described the action as it appeared from the other 
point of view. Admiral Jellicoe, the British Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and Admiral Scheer, the German 
Commander-in-Chief, have both written books and 
explained their respective maneuvers fully and 
frankly. For these two books students of naval 
affairs should be deeply grateful. It should be 
recognized, however, that they are, necessarily, one- 
sided treatments. The subject, moreover, has be- 
come highly controversial, and, as a consequence, 
has been confused by somewhat misleading argu- 
mentative discussions. 

Important questions of present and future naval 
policy depend, in large measure, upon conclusions 
drawn from the experiences of Jutland. The study 
of this engagement is an urgent matter and does 
not admit delay. No apology, therefore, is made 
for this attempt to gather together in one narrative 
authentic information available from both British 

[vii] 



PREFACE 

and German sources, and to give, as accurately as 
may be, an unbiased analysis of the battle. 

Acknowledgment is made to officers of the War 
College and officers of the U. S. S. Pennsylvania 
for valued criticism and comment received dur- 
ing preparation of the manuscript. Acknowledg- 
ment is also made to Lieutenant G. J. Hazard, 
U.S.N.R.F., for his skill and courtesy in the work 
of making the diagrams. 

C. C. Gill. 



[viii] 



CONTENTS 



I THE TACTICS 


OF THE BATTLE 




17 


II FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE 


THE 




BATTLE . 






32 


Ill THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE 




68 


IV THE BATTLE 


First Phase 




60 


V THE BATTLE: 


Second Phase . 




80 


VI THE BATTLE: 


Third Phase . 




117 


VII THE BATTLE: 


Fourth Phase . 




137 


lUI THE BATTLE: 


Fifth Phase 




150 


IX CONCLUSION 






165 


APPENDICES: 








Losses and Damage .... 


. 


171 


Design of Wae Vessels as Affected by 




Jutland . 




, 


175 



[ix] 



LIST OF DIAGRAMS 



DIAGRAM 

NO. 



Chart of North Sea, Showing Strategic 

Dispositions 22 

Battle Cruisers and Fast Battleships 
(Showing Tonnage, Speed, Armor, and 
Armament) . 33 

German High Sea Fleet in Cruising Forma- 
tion (Showing Tonnage, Speed, Armor, 
and Armament) 35 

British Battle Fleet of 24 Dreadnaughts 
(Showing Tonnage, Speed, Armor, and 
Armament) 39 

Relative Positions of All Forces at 
2:00 P.M., 31 May, 1916 43 

Cruising Formation of Forces Under Imme- 
diate Command of Admiral Jellicoe and 
Rear Admiral Hood 47 

Cruising Formation of Forces Under Imme- 
diate Command of Vice Admiral Beatty 
AND Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas . . 61 



Cruising Formation of Reconnaissance 
Force Commanded by Vice Admiral Hip- 
per . . . . • 



55 



Track of the Battle Cruisers During 
Their Battle Approach (2:00 P.M. to 
3:48 P.M., 31 May) 61 

[Xi] 



LIST OF DIAGRAMS 

DTAGRAM 
NO, PAGE 

10 Track of the Heavy Ships During the 

First Phase (2:00 P.M. to 4:55 P.M.) . 63 

11 At 3:48 P.M. the Opposing Battle Cruisers 

Open Fire 67 

12 At 4 :08 P.M. Admiral, Beatty Increases the 

Range and Admiral Evan-Thomas Closes 
Enough to Open Fire at Long Range . 71 

13 At 4:45 P.M. Both Sides Deliver. Torpedo 

Attacks 75 

14 At 4 :55 P.M. Admiral Beatty Takes North- 

west Course, and Admiral Scheer Joins 

IN Battle 81 

15 Track of the Heavy Ships During the 

Second Phase (4:55 P.M. to 6:40 P.M.) 87 

16 At 5 :45 P.M. Admiral Hood's Light Forces 

Engage Admiral Hipper's Advance 
Scouts. In the Meanwhile Scheer Slows 
Down and Reforms His Fleet ... 91 

17 At 6 :16 P.M. Admiral Jellicoe Deploys the 

British Battle Fleet to Port and Slows 
Down, While Admiral Beatty Closes 
German Van at Utmost Speed ... 95 

18 British Battleships in Approach Forma- 

tion with Destroyers in Position No. 1 

for Deployment on Left Flank Division 101 

19 At 6:35 P.M. Admiral Jellicoe Completes 

His Deployment and Admiral Scheer 
Executes a "Swing-Around" Withdrawing 

Maneuver . » , 107 

[xii] 



LIST OF DIAGRAMS 

DIAGRAM 
NO. PAGE 

20 Track of the Heavy Ships During the 

Third Phase (6:40 P.M. to 7:17 P.M.) 119 

21 At 7:17 P.M. Admiiial Scheer, After At- 

tacking THE British Center, Again Exe- 
cutes His Withdrawal Maneuver . . 125 

22 Track of the Heavy Ships During the 

Fourth Phase (7:17 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. 
—Dark) ........ 139 

23 At 8:30 P.M. Admiral Beatty Is Again 

Engaged. Admiral, Jellicoe Turns to 

the Southwest 143 

24 Track op the Heavy Ships During the 

Fifth Phase (9:00 P.M. 31 May to 3:00 
A.M. 1 June) 151 

25 British Night Cruising Formation Signaled 

Shortly After 9 .00 P.M., 31 May . . 155 

26 Maneuvers on June 1st After the Battle 159 



[xiii] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 



WHAT HAPPENED 
AT JUTLAND 



THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE 

"Strategy" prepares battles ; "tactics" fights them. 
Strategy decides the force to be sent to any theater 
of operations, assigns the task or mission, arranges 
logistics — ^the supply of food, fuel and munitions, 
— coordinates effort by land and sea on all fronts, 
and in general deals with the larger considerations 
in the conduct of war. The decisions of strategy 
regarding the disposition and employment of fleets 
and armies are carried out by tactical maneuvers. 
It is thus seen that strategy and tactics are closely 
related. Tactics, in fact, is an instrument of strat- 
egy. There is no clear line of demarcation between 
the two, and confusion rather than clarity is likely 
to result if attempt is made to consider the one as 
quite distinct from the other. 

Tactics may be defined broadly as embracing 
that part of strategy which has to do with maneu- 
vers in the field. For instance, strategy decides to 

[17] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

move a fleet from one port to another, and the 
maneuvers used to carry out the decision are "tac- 
tical." Maneuvers in the face of the enemy, for 
approach, for battle, for chase, or for retirement, 
comprise battle tactics. 

Although the highest form of tactics is an aggres- 
sive offensive to destroy the fighting power of the 
enemy, it sometimes happens that a temporary de- 
fensive attitude by certain forces is essential to the 
success of the general plan. A premature attack, 
even if a local tactical victory is achieved, may be 
detrimental rather than helpful in the accomplish- 
ment of the principal objective; or the cost of a 
victory may be greater than it is worth ; or the situ- 
ation may be such that it is not prudent to risk a 
battle. War is a serious business in which quixotic 
motives, however worthy they may be from a senti- 
mental point of view, have no place. 

Strategy is the master of tactics and determines 
their character, which, according to the war objec- 
tive and the circumstances of the special situation, 
may be aggressive or evasive, offensive or defen- 
sive. Tactical decisions have to be made in the 
light of strategic considerations. 

With this brief digression to explain the term 
"tactics" and the relation of "tactics" to "strategy," 
we shall now turn to a study of the battle of Jut- 
land. 

Throughout the war the main Naval Battle 
[18] 



THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE 

Front was in the North Sea. Here the fleet of 
Great Britain, officially named the Grand Fleet, 
faced the German fleet, named the High Sea Fleet. 
In this area of about 120,000 square miles these two 
most powerful fleets in the world were continually 
engaged in a great strategic contest. The stake 
was absolute control of the seas and on this con- 
trol hinged ultimately the issue of the World War. 
In main features the strategy employed by both 
England and Germany followed normal lines. 
England's naval policy was to establish control of 
all the great ocean areas by destroying enemy ships 
abroad, and to stop Germany's ocean trade and con- 
tain her home fleets by a so-called "distant block- 
ade." The menace of off shore mine and torpedo 
operations covered by an inferior but powerful 
German battle fleet made a close blockade of Ger- 
man ports impracticable. The Grand Fleet, under 
Commander-in-Chief Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, 
was ready to fight in the open sea, but the margin 
of superiority was not deemed sufficient to warrant 
seeking an engagement with the High Sea Fleet 
under conditions of Germany's own choosing, in the 
vicinity of her mine fields and submarine bases. 
Except for occasional excursions to the South, 
England's battleships were held on watch in the 
less dangerous waters to the northward, in the vi- 
cinity of Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands. An out- 
post detachment of light cruisers, destroyers and 
submarines operated from Harwich, the nearest 

[19] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

suitable port on the English coast to the enemy fleet 
base behind Heligoland, while the Dover patrol 
guarded the Straits. These outpost vessels were 
supported by Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruiser 
fleet based at Rosyth; and in April, 1916, an addi- 
tional support of eight predreadnaughts and four 
cruisers was stationed in the Humber to safeguard 
the coast against sudden invasion. Fast German 
cruisers could make sudden raids upon the coast 
or even the channel, but they always ran the risk of 
being intercepted by a superior force and could 
hardly expect to do damage of military signifi- 
cance. (Diagram I.) 

The war plan of Germany assigned her navy an 
offensive-defensive role. It was the objective of 
the High Sea Fleet to keep the Allied Naval forces 
at a distance from German shores ; to safeguard the 
North and West frontiers j oining the Army flanks 
in Russia and Belgiimi; to blockade Russia's Baltic 
ports ; and at the same time maintain open German 
sea communications with the northern neutrals. 

Germany did not wish to challenge the superior 
British fleet to decisive action on the high seas, but 
preferred to operate her battleships within re- 
stricted areas as a fleet in being, that is to say, hold- 
ing the High Sea Fleet as a continual menace, 
within supporting distance of shielding mine fields 
and submarines among which it would not be 
prudent for the British fleet to advance to attack. 
In addition it was the plan of Germany to institute 
[20] 



J^S> 




1. Beatty at 3 

2. " " 4 

3. Scheer " 4 

4. Jellicoe " 6 



48 P.M. 5. Beatty at 6 



6. Jellicoe " 7 

7 



40 " 
55 " 
14 " 



<< (« 



50 P.M. 
41 " 
00 " 



THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE 

raids for moral effect and also to endeavor to bring 
about such a division of the British Fleet as might 
permit a locally superior German force to engage 
and destroy a British detachment. By tactics of 
attrition Germany hoped to reduce Britain's supe- 
riority until her fleet could be engaged on more 
equal terms. 

Mines and submarines, always useful for the 
weaker naval power, were assiduously used by the 
Germans. When it was seen that the war was to 
be a long one, German strategists realized that the 
pressure of the sea blockade would fall heavily on 
German economic life. A counter naval offensive 
was necessary and the only weapon Germany could 
use was her submarines. The U-boat campaign 
against commerce was inaugurated and came peril- 
ously near to success. But it should be borne in 
mind that it was the protection of German dread- 
naught guns that released these U-boats from 
coast defense duties and permitted them compara- 
tive freedom of operation. 

It has been contended that Great Britain, by 
her North Sea blockade, enjoyed all the advantages 
which would have been gained by the destruction 
of the High Sea Fleet. This is not correct. Ger- 
many's fleet was an important factor throughout 
the war. It was the power of this fleet that made 
the Baltic practically a German Lake, maintained 
open the trade routes between Germany and the 
North European neutrals, closed Russia's chief 

[25] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

ports, and protected the German frontiers from 
the Gulf of Riga to Holland. It would be diffi- 
cult to overestimate the influence, both direct and 
indirect, which the German High Sea Fleet ex- 
erted in bringing about the collapse of Russia. 
And, finally it was the cover of the High Sea Bat- 
tle Fleet that permitted the U-boats freedom to 
come and go in the prosecution of their campaign 
against commerce. In estimating the tactical sit- 
uation in the North Sea there should be no mis- 
understanding as to the essential task performed 
by the German battleship fleet, and the great in- 
fluence a decisive British victory at Jutland would 
have had on the course of the war. 

Turning now to the particular strategy which 
culminated in the battle of Jutland, it will be re- 
called that in May, 1916, the general military situ- 
ation was not particularly pleasing for Germany. 
Russia was a powerful enemy. Her Baltic Fleet 
was then by no means negligible and had been co- 
operating in the Gulf of Riga with the right flank 
of the Russian Army. On the Western front the 
German offensive at Verdun had not succeeded. 
While the German General Staff did not, in all 
probability, feel any great anxiety as to the condi- 
tions on the land frontiers, still, the promise of 
victory made to the German people had not ma- 
terialized. Although the submarine campaign 
against commerce was in operation, it was re- 
[26] 



THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE 

stricted, and as yet no great amount of tonnage had 
been sunk. In 1916 Germany was not ready to 
risk an open rupture with America, and the vigor- 
ous protest of the United States against unlawful 
sinkings had resulted in a diplomatic humiliation 
damaging to German prestige. Under these cir- 
cumstances it was logical strategy for Admiral 
Scheer, Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea 
Fleet, to seek a successful naval demonstration in 
order to strengthen national morale. 

In studying the dispositions which led up to the 
battle of Jutland and the tactical decisions made by 
Scheer and Hipper during the engagement, it is 
important to understand the German point of view. 
The German people at this time were demanding 
greater activity on the part of their fleet in justi- 
fication of the vast sums spent for its creation and 
maintenance, and to make more distinctly manifest 
its war-time usefulness. In view of the general sit- 
uation, and further in view of this popular demand 
for greater fleet activity, in the spring of 1916, 
the German strategists had decided to launch a 
more aggressive naval campaign the object of 
which was to strike at England by sea in such a way 
as to deprive her of inclination to continue the war. 

Commander-in-Chief Scheer reasoned that this 
could be achieved by a successful blow at English 
sea power centered in the navy, or by a blow at 
British financial life centered in commercial ship- 

[27] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

ping, or — ^better yet — ^by a combination of both 
these courses.* 

Admiral Scheer, in estimating the situation, 
argued that if the High Sea Fleet was withheld on 
the defensive while the U-boats instituted a vigor- 
ous campaign against merchant ships, then, if the 
submarines were successful. Admiral Jellicoe might 
lead out the Grand Fleet on an aggressive offensive 
which might compel Germany to fight a fleet to 
fleet action at Admiral Jellicoe's selected time; that 
there was disadvantage in thus giving the initiative 
to the British, as Admiral Jellicoe might choose a 
time when part of the German forces were imder 
repairs, or otherwise unfit for service, or absent in 
the Baltic for exercises; and, therefore, that the 
wiser plan was for Germany to assume the initia- 
tive, and conduct definite, systematic operations to 
induce the British to send out forces and afford the 
High Sea Fleet opportunity to attack them under 
conditions favorable to Admiral Scheer, at his — 
not Admiral Jellicoe's — selected time.f 

The minor raids already conducted against Eng- 
land had made an impression. The successful bom- 
bardment of Lowestoft on April 25th, and the 
escape of the raiders, had caused public dissatis- 
faction, and Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, had announcedHhat should the German 
ships again venture to show themselves off the Brit- 

* Reference, Admiral Scheer's book "The German High Seas Fleet 
in the World War." 
t Reference, Admiral Scheer's book. 

[28] 



THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE 

ish coast, measures had been taken to insure their 
being severely punished. (After this raid the 3rd 
Battle Squadron of predreadnaughts and the 3rd 
Cruiser Squadron were withdrawn from Scapa and 
stationed in the Humber to guard the English 
coast. ) 

Reasoning from these premises, Admiral Scheer 
planned operations to bring about a naval battle 
on terms advantageous to Germany during the pe- 
riod May 23rd to June 1st, 1916. It should be 
added that Admiral Scheer was not seeking a de- 
cisive fleet battle unless he could succeed in drawing 
the British fleet into a trap. What he sought was 
an opportunity to engage and destroy with superior 
force an inferior detachment of the British fleet 
before the main body could arrive in support. To 
do this Admiral Scheer was ready to risk a "tip 
and run" encounter with the British Main Fleet, 
and for this contingency he had a carefully re- 
hearsed maneuver of retirement by which he in- 
tended to withdraw the High Sea Fleet should it 
become involved against a superior British concen- 
tration. 

In brief, the German enterprise involved a 
cruiser bombardment of Sunderland to draw out 
British naval forces, and an endeavor to lead these 
British forces toward the supporting German Bat- 
tle Fleet so that Admiral Scheer might attack them 
under favorable conditions. During this week, 
May 23rd to June 1st, about 24 U-boats were sta- 

[29] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

tioned off the British ports of sortie and along the 
probable enemy routes of advance, to observe and 
attack. Also, a large number of Zeppelins were 
assigned to assist the enterprise by reconnaissance 
from the air. (Diagram 1.) 

The fact that the U-boats could not remain out 
longer than June 1st imposed this limit to the 
operation. The attack on Sunderland required 
clear weather. Of this Admiral Scheer states : "An 
extensive aerial reconnaissance was an imperative 
necessity for an advance on Sunderland in the 
northwest, as it would lead into waters where we 
could not allow ourselves to be forced into giving 
battle.'* 

If the weather continued unfavorable for scout- 
ing from the air, a substitute plan was provided by 
which, in place of the Sunderland bombardment, 
an advance against cruisers and shipping, in and 
near the Skaggerak, was to be employed in order 
to draw out the British forces. Operating in this 
direction made it possible to do without the air 
reconnaissance as the Jutland coast offered a cer- 
tain amount of cover against surprise, and also the 
distance to the British points of support was con- 
siderably greater. 

The order issued by Admiral Scheer on May 
18th was as follows: 

"The bombardment of Sunderland by our 
cruisers is intended to compel the enemy to send 
[30] 



THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE 

out forces against us. For the attack on the ad- 
vancing enemy the High Sea Fleet forces to be 
south of the Dogger Bank, and the U-boats to be 
stationed for attack off the east coast of England. 
The enemy's ports of sortie will be closed by mines.* 
The Naval Corps will support the undertaking with 
their U-boats. If time and circumstances permit, 
trade-war will be carried on during proceed- 
ings. . . ." 

Each day proved unfavorable for airship obser- 
vation and on the 31st Admiral Scheer decided to 
use the modified plan by which the advance against 
shipping in the Skaggerak was substituted for the 
bombardment of Sunderland. That reconnaissance 
from the air could not be depended upon during the 
entire period from May 23rd to June 1st directs 
attention to one of the limitations of aircraft as 
scouts. 

* One of these mines later caused the loss of the Cruiser HampMre 
with Earl Kitchener and his staff. 



[81] 



II 



FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE 
BATTLE 

At early dawn of May 31st, Vice Admiral Hip- 
per, commanding the German advance reconnais- 
sance force of 5 battle cruisers attended by 5 
light cruisers and 33 destroyers, left the Jade Basin 
and stood out to sea followed one half hour later 
by the supporting High Sea Battle Fleet. (Dia- 
grams 2, 3.) The "Third Squadron," 7 of Ger- 
many's most modern dreadnaughts, was in the van 
with the Flagship Koenig leading; then came 
Squadron One, 9 dreadnaughts of the Heligoland 
and Nassau type, led by the Fleet Flagship, 
Friedrich der Grosse, flying the flag of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Admiral Scheer; and bringing up 
the rear was the "Second Squadron," 6 predread- 
naughts of the Deutschland class. The entire fleet 
numbered 22 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 11 light 
cruisers and about 78 destroyers. This second 
most powerful fleet in the world was a compar- 
atively new creation. Germany had almost no 
naval traditions. At this time, however. Admiral 
Scheer's force was in a high state of efficiency with 
[32] 



BEATTV. 

TIGER 28.500. 8-\3.5". 23K.,9>. 

LION ") 

QUEEN MARY ( 26.350 TONS. Z8K. 

PRINCESS ROYAL ]^''^-^"^^^-^^^°^ ^' 
NEW ZEALAND ") 16.800 TONS, ESK. 
INDEFATIGABLE J 6-l2'GUNS. ARMOR 6! 

HOOD. 

mVlNGBLE I n.2501t)NS.25>C 

INDOMITABLE L.^-^ij^s. ^rmOR6- 
INFLEXIBLE J 



IlVAN TH0MA5 

BARHAM 



VALIANT 

WARSPITE 

MALAYA ^ 



2T.5O0T0NS, 25 K., 
&-»5"GUNS, ARMOR is: 



HIPPBR 
I OERFFLINGER "i 26.180T0NS 

d LUTZOW J 8-12"GUNS. 26K,ARM0RI2' 

I 5EYDUTZ 24.6\0. lO-U" 26.75 K, 1 1.75" A. 

I MOLTKE 22.640. lO-ll" 27.25K., U"A 

• VONDERTANN 19.100. . 8-U" 2GIC,S.75'A. 

Diagram No. 2 

battle cruisers and fast battleships (showing 
tonnage, speed, armor and armament) 

[33] 



m. 

I KONIG 

• GROSSER KURFURST 
I MARKGRAF 
I KRONPRINZ 

• KAISER I 
I PRINZ REGENT LUITPOLO 
I KAISERIN 1 



25.390 TONS. 
I0-I2"GUNS. SPEED 23. 
ARMOR 14": 

24.440 TONS. 
lO-t2"GUNS. SPEED 21. 
ARMOR 13.75' 



I. 

% FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE 
I OSTFRIESLAND 
I THURmGEM 
• HELGOLAND 
i OLDENBURG 
I POSEN 
I RHEINLAND 
I NASSAU 
I WESTFALEN 



24.410, \0-\Z'\ 21K.»»3.76*^. 

2Z.400TONS. 
I2-|2"&UNS, SPEED 20.5. 
ARMOR 11.75" 

18.600 TONS. 

12-M "GUNS. SPEED 20.^ 
ARMOR U.75: 



E. 

I DEUTSCHLAND 

I POMMERM 

I SCHLESIEN 

I SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 

• HANNOVER 

# H ESSEN 



J3200TONS. 
4-U"GUNS. SPEED 18. 

ARMOR ais: 



Diagram No. 3 

german high sea fleet in cruising formation 

(showing TONNAGE, SPEED, ARMOR AND ARMAMENT) 

Distance between ships 760 yards. Distance between 
squadrons 3,800 yards. For battle formation distances 
were closed to: 550 yards between ships and 1,100 yards 
between squadrons 

[35] 



FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE 

a personnel as yet untainted by the sinister influ- 
ences which later broke down its morale and finally 
culminated in mutiny. 

Mine sweepers had cleared a way through the 
British fields and screening destroyers zig-zagged 
in and out to keep down any submarines that might 
be lying in wait. When west of Amrum Bank, 
the course was laid north, and Admiral Hipper 
with his advance force proceeded to carry out his 
orders, which were to pass out of sight of Horn 
Reefs and the Danish coast, show himself off the 
Skaggerak before dark, cruise in the Skaggerak 
during the night, and at noon of the next day join 
up with the Main Fleet. Groups of English cruis- 
ers had been reported off the Norwegian coast. It 
was expected that the presence of Hipper off the 
Skaggerak would be reported, that British forces 
would start from England soon after the receipt 
of this information, and that, in all probability, a 
battle would result on the following day, June 1st. 

On this day the British Grand Fleet was also at 
sea. It was part of British naval strategy to 
make periodic sweeps through the waters of the 
North Sea, and one of these sweeps was now in 
progress.* 

It appears that on the 30th the German Flag- 

* Admiral Jellicoe has stated : — "In accordance with instructions 
contained in their Lordship's telegram, No. 434-, of 30 May, the 
Grand Fleet proceeded to sea for the purpose of carrying out one 
of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea." 

[37] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

ship had been sending an unusually large number 
of messages. Although these code messages could 
not be deciphered, the sending ship was identified, 
and by directional radio instruments the British had 
determined a movement of the German Flagship 
of about 7 miles, indicating that she had shifted 
from the inner harbor of Wilhelmshaven to an outer 
anchorage in the Jade Basin. The British knew 
that the German fleet was ready for sea, and naval 
activity of some sort was inferred. 

Because of this inference and the consequent 
timely sailing of the British Grand Fleet, however, 
it does not follow that Admiral Jellicoe had fore- 
knowledge that a fleet to fleet action was pending. 
It is also to be remembered that a considerable force 
of British light cruisers and destroyers were held 
in port at Harwich. It is reasonable to suppose 
that had the British Admiralty been informed of 
the German plan this Harwich force would have 
been sent out to take part in the battle. 

On the evening of May 30th, the British battle 
fleet of 24 dreadnaughts, attended by 3 battle cruis- 
ers, 12 light cruisers, 8 armored cruisers, and 46 
destroyers had sailed from the northern bases, 
and a few hours later Admiral Beatty's advance 
force of 4 fast dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 15 
light cruisers, and 31 destroyers had set out from 
Rosyth. (Diagrams 2 and 4.) The entire British 
fleet formed a veritable armada totaling 28 dread- 
naughts, 9 battle cruisers, 27 light cruisers, 8 ar- 
[88] 



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Diagram No. 4 

british battle fleet of 24 dreadnaughts (show- 
ing tonnage, speed, armor and armament) 

[39] 



FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE 

mored cruisers, and 77 destroyers. It represented 
the acme of naval development. Never before in 
history had such a powerful array of fighting ships 
been grouped under one command. These ships 
were manned, moreover, by a personnel steeped in 
the traditions of England's long mastery of the 
seas, traditions epitomized in the names of Blake, 
Hawke, and Nelson. 

At this period of the war, no continuous British 
submarine observation was maintained off the Ger- 
man bases, and Admiral Jellicoe received no re- 
ports of the departure of the High Sea Fleet. The 
advantage of the initiative enabled Germany to 
send out observing U-boats which were stationed 
approximately as indicated on the chart (Diagram 
1) : — Some off Scapa Flow; one off Moray Firth; 
a large number off the Firth of Forth ; several off 
the Humber; and the remainder north of Ter- 
schelling Bank watching the approaches to the 
Straits and Harwich. 

At 5:30 A.M., on the 30th, U-32, about 70 miles 
east of the Firth of Forth, reported two British 
battleships, two cruisers, and several destroyers 
making a southeast course. These were probably 
part of Sir David Beatty's force which had sailed 
from Rosyth. An hour later this same submarine 
reported that she had intercepted English radio 
messages to the effect that two battleships and 
groups of destroyers had sailed from Scapa. 
Shortly after this, U-66 reported from about 60 

[41] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

miles east of Kinnaird Head, a squadron of eight 
British battleships, attended by light cruisers and 
destroyers, on a northeast course. These evi- 
dently belonged to Sir Martin Jerram's Squadron 
which was en route from Cromarty to rendezvous 
at sea with the rest of the battle fleet which had 
sailed from Scapa. 

From the above reports Admiral Scheer esti- 
mated that the diverging courses of the detach- 
ments sighted did not indicate a large operation 
such as an advance on the German bight; nor, to 
his mind, did they appear to have any connection 
with the German enterprise. To Admiral Scheer 
this information from his submarine scouts pre- 
saged, not a British fleet concentration, but rather 
a likelihood that his hope of meeting with separate 
British detachments might be fulfilled. He was, 
therefore, the more encouraged to carry out his 
plan. 

At 2 :00 P.M., on May 31st, the opposing forces 
were in the relative positions shown in Diagram 5. 

The main body of the British Grand Fleet, com- 
manded by Admiral Jellicoe, was about 70 miles off 
the Norway coast in Lat. 57° 57' N., Long. 3° 45' 
E. From JelHcoe Beatty bore S. 23° E. and was 
distant 77 miles, while Scheer bore about S. 40° E. 
and was distant about 150 miles. The Grand Fleet 
was disposed as indicated in Diagram 6. The 24 
dreadnaught battleships were steaming in six col- 
umns of four ships each with a close anti-submarine 
screen of 4 light cruisers and about 34 destroy- 
[42] 



JELLICOE 




E/AN THOMAS i\\\ 
BEATTY 




German Des^roNers 
ei^amininq neulral steamer 
at^:^oRM. 



— 50 miles 




SCREEN 



Diagram No. 5 

RELATIVE POSITIONS OF ALL FORCES AT 2:00 P.M. 

[43] 



FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE 

ers; 5 light cruisers covered the front of the capi- 
tal ships 3 miles in advance of the main body, 6 
armored cruisers were spread 6 miles apart on a 
line 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet and a link- 
ing armored cruiser to relay signals was placed 6 
miles toward the Commander-in-Chief's Flagship, 
the Iron Duke. Each armored cruiser was attended 
by one destroyer. The Third Battle Cruiser 
Squadron, Hood's three Invincibles, with two light 
cruisers and four destroyers, was stationed 20 miles 
ahead of the Battle Fleet. All this force had a 
fleet speed of 20 knots and was now zig-zagging, 
speed of advance 14 knots in the direction S. 50° E. 
The advance force under Vice Admiral Beatty, 
consisting of six battle cruisers and four 25-knot 
battleships with attending light cruisers and de- 
stroyers, was disposed as shown in Diagram 7. The 
1st Squadron of four battle cruisers was in single 
line ahead, led by Admiral Beatty's Flagship, the 
Lion, and screened by the light cruiser Champion 
and ten destroyers of the 13th Flotilla. The 2d 
Squadron of two battle cruisers was 3 miles E.N.E. 
of the JLion and screened by six destroyers. The 
5th Battleship Squadron, four dreadnaughts of the 
Queen Elizabeth class, was 5 miles N.N.W. of the 
Lion and screened by one light cruiser and nine 
destroyers of the 1st Flotilla.* A scouting and 
screening line of eleven light cruisers was eight 

* The name ship Queen Elizabeth was undergoing repairs after 
severe service in tie Dardanelles Campaign. 

[45] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

miles S.S.E. of the Liorij spread in a direction 
E.N.E. and W.S.W., distance between ships five 
miles. The Engadine, a sea-plane carrier, was also 
with these light cruisers. The link ship Yarmouth 
was midway between the line of light cruisers and 
the Lion. All this advance force had a fleet speed 
of twenty-five knots and was now advancing on a 
course north by east toward the rendezvous with 
the Battle Fleet, at a speed of nineteen and one 
half knots. 

By the plan of the sweep Jellicoe was to be at 
position "A," Lat. 57° 45' N., Long. 4° 15' E. at 
2:00 P.M. (Diagram 1.) The Battle Fleet had 
been delayed, however, to wait for a destroyer to 
examine some trawlers and was eighteen miles be- 
hind schedule. Beatty's 2:00 P.M. position, ac- 
cording to the plan, was Lat. 56° 40' N., Long. 5° 
00' E. (Point "A"' in Diagram 1.) He actually 
was about twelve miles N. 64° W. from this point, 
Lat. 56° 46' N., Long. 4° 40' E., thus bringing 
the relative positions of Beatty and Jellicoe within 
six or seven miles of the plan, but geographically 
some twelve or fifteen miles to the westward. Ad- 
miral Beatty had been informed that Admiral Jel- 
licoe would sweep to the south from point *'A." 

Considerable criticism has been made of this dis- 
position of the British forces, to the effect that 
Beatty was too far away from Jellicoe. They were 
then operating seventy-seven miles apart. This is 
a matter of opinion, and depends upon the plan of 
[46] 



^/JBLLI&E 

^ / X^/ /4TH. LIGHT CRUISCR 
*=*» / ^^^ SQUADRON.' 




Cochrane 



2nd. cruiser 

SaUADRON 



OuKe of Edinburqh 



/ 



/ 



1ST CRUISER 
SQUADRON. 



Black Prino 



HOOD 
^^ * Contcrbury 
Chester 



Diagram No. 6 

cruising formation of forces under immediate 
command of admiral jellicoe and rear admiral 

HOOD 

[*7] 



FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE 

coordination. It will be noted later on that a dis- 
crepancy of twelve miles developed in the naviga- 
tional reckoning of Jellicoe and Beatty. This 
caused confusion at the critical juncture when Jelli- 
coe joined Beatty in action against the enemy. 
While it is not considered tactically unsound to 
operate a fast detachment this distance in advance 
of the supporting battle fleet, it is of utmost im- 
portance that proper touch be maintained by link- 
ing up ships or other means, and suitable precau- 
tions taken to assure that the detachment be not 
trapped and cut off by a superior enemy force. 

The main body of the High Sea Fleet, com- 
manded by Admiral Scheer, was now fifty miles 
west of Lyngvig on the Jutland coast. The twenty- 
two battleships were steaming in column with the 
seven most modern dreadnaughts in the van squad- 
ron, the eight older type dreadnaughts led by the 
Fleet Flagship, Friednch der Grosse, in the center, 
and the predreadnaught squadron of six ships 
bringing up the rear. The distance between ships 
was 763 yards and the interval between squadrons 
was 3,800 yards. (Diagram 3.) Six light cruisers 
with destroyers were spread ahead as a protective 
scout line, and the balance of the forty-four destroy- 
ers attending the battleships operated as a close-up 
anti-submarine screen. All this force had a maxi- 
mum fleet speed of seventeen knots and was now 
on course north, speed fourteen knots. Compar- 
ing the cruising formations of the two fleets, it is 

[49] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

seen from Diagram 6 that Jellieoe was in line of 
divisions with his strength fairly well distributed, 
favoring his left and center; the right center car- 
ried the weaker ships, while the right flank division 
was strengthened by the Marlborough and the Re- 
venge: on the other hand, Diagram 3 shows that 
S cheer was in extended column, his most powerful 
ships in the van, the intermediate strength in the 
center, and the weak predreadnaughts in the rear. 
Diagrams 2, 3 and 4 show the order of ships, their 
heavy gun strength, their main armor protection, 
and their speed. 

The advance German force, technically named 
the "Reconnaissance Force," under Vice Admiral 
Hipper, comprising 5 battle cruisers, 5 light 
cruisers and 33 destroyers, was about 50 miles 
ahead of Scheer and about 50 miles east of Beatty. 
(See Diagram 8.) The 5 battle cruisers were in 
column, attended by a close-up anti-submarine de- 
stroyer screen, while the light cruisers and other 
destroyers were spread out in a semicircle about ten 
miles ahead and on either flank. All this advance 
force had a fleet speed of about 26% knots and was 
proceeding on a northerly course at a speed of 
about 24 knots. Comparing the opposing battle 
cruisers, it is to be noted that the British were 
superior in gun power and the Germans in armor 
protection. German naval construction had, at a 
sacrifice in gun power, devoted a larger percentage 
of ship tonnage to armor protection. 
[50] 



^EVAN THOMAS 
'BEATTY 



Xo Phaeton 



\ 



'OYofmouth 

% 



>falmouTn 



) Inconstant 
'o Cordelia 




BirKenhead ,. 

jy 0*- Enqadmt 

^ oGioucester 



flNottinqham 
/o Dublin 



Southampton 
oBirminqham 



Diagram No. 7 

cruising formation op forces under immediate 
command of vice admiral beatty and rear ad- 
miral evan-thomas 

[51] 



FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE 

TABLE COMPARING STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES 

Type. British. German. 

(Beatty) (Hipper) 

Dreadnaught Battleships 4 

Battle Cruisers 6 5 

Light Cruisers 15* 5 

Destroyers . . . . f 31 S3 

* Including one Sea-plane Carrier. 

Type. British. German. 

(Jellicoe) (Scheer) 

Dreadnaught Battleships 24 16 

Predreadnaught Battleships .... 6 

Battle Cruisers 3 

Armored Cruisers 8 

Light Cruisers 12 6 

Destroyers 46 45 

There is still some question as to the exact num- 
ber of destroyers present. Lieutenant Commander 
Frost in the Naval Institute Proceedings gives 
the following comparative table: — 

Dreadnaught Battleships 28 647,550 16 363,360 1.78 to 1 

Battle Cruisers 9 196,900 5 118,710 1.66 to 1 

Light Cruisers 26 108,290 11 44,726 2.42 to 1 

Destroyers 78 77,200* 77 or less 60,300* 1.28 to 1 
* Approximate 

Comparing the totals of the two fleets on a ton- 
nage basis, the British had an aggregate superiority 
of about 7 to 4 or 1.75 to 1. (The armored cruisers 
of the British and the predreadnaught s of the 
Germans are not included in this comparison. ) In- 
cluding the German predreadnaughts the aggre- 
gate tonnage of German capital ships was 561,110 
as against the British 844,450. 

[53] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

The British had a total of 344 heavy guns: 48 
15-inch, 10 14-inch, 142 13.5-inch, and 144 12-inch. 
The Germans had a total of 244 heavy guns: 144 
12-inch, and 100 11-inch. 

A 15-inch shell weighs 1,950 lbs., a 14-inch shell 
weighs 1,600 lbs., a 13.5-inch 1,400 lbs., a 12-inch 
850 lbs.,* and an 11 -inch 760 lbs. A single dis- 
charge of all British heavy guns in the battle of 
Jutland weighed 713,600 lbs. as compared with 
217,264 lbs. for the German side.f 

In armor protection the German ships were bet- 
ter provided than the British. Tonnage is the fair- 
est basis of comparison, as it represents capital 
that can be invested at discretion for offense and de- 
fense. 

In the battle itself, submarines and aircraft took 
no actual part. The British had a sea-plane car- 
rier which flew some planes during the approach 
but they accomplished nothing of note. No British 
submarines were in the battle. The Germans had 
twenty-four submarines and ten airships which took 
part in the operations, but none of these were pres- 
ent on the field of action during the afternoon and 

* A 12-inch British weighs 850 lbs. The German 12-inch is heav- 
ier and Comdr. Bellairs gives its weight as 981 lbs. 

t All the British 15-inch, 14-inch and 13.5 inch, except the Erin's 
13.5-inch, were in center line turrets bearing on both broadsides. All 
the 12-inch and 11-inch, however, were not capable of being fired on 
both sides. Tlie Germans suffered particularly in this respect. The 
four Heligolands lost four 12-inch guns each, and the four Nassans 
lost four 11-inch each. Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt gives the superiority 
of the Grand Fleet to the High Sea Fleet at Jutland as 175 per cent 
in weight of broadsides, or nearly 3 to 1. ("Naval Construction 
During the War" by Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt.) 

[54] 



kWiesbaden 
« Frankfurt- A xi nolf notiUa 8.61, 

hXIlHartFloJilto 



kPillou 
*»»Torpedo Boots 



» Dbinq 
• » » Torpedo BoQ^s (Bioj,iio.ui) 



iJteqensburq 
••«»TorpfdoBoot» 



Screen v^ HIPPES 



Diagram No. 8 

cruising formation of reconnaissance force com 
manded by vice admiral hipper 

[55] 



FLEET MOVEMENTS BEFORE BATTLE 

evening of May 31st. Although between the hours 
of two and three P.M. five Zeppelins ascended for 
long distance reconnaissance in the sector north to 
west of Heligoland, they did not see their own 
fleet, nor the British fleet, nor did they hear any- 
thing of the battle.* 

* In speaking of U-boat enterprises and their tactical employment. 
Admiral Scheer states: — 

"Cooperation with separate units or with the entire Fleet could not 
be suflBciently well organized to prove dependable for certain opera- 
tions. Tactical cooperation would have been understood to mean 
that on the Fleet putting out to sea with the possibility of en- 
countering the enemy, numbers of U-boats would be present from 
the beginning in order to be able to join in the battle. Even as 
certain rules have been evolved for the employment of cruisers and 
torpedo boats in daylight battle to support the activity of the battle- 
ship fleet, so might an opportunity have been found for the tactical 
employment of the U-boats. But no preliminary work had been 
done in that respect and it would have been a very risky experi- 
ment to take U-boats into battle without a thorough trial. The two 
principal drawbacks are their inadequate speed and the possibility 
of their not distinguishing between friend and foe. 

"Only temporary cooperation was possible in the case of enter- 
prises by the Fleet and attacks by the U-boats when each unit had 
a special duty, to be mutually supplemented but without exacting 
any tactical union. If, for instance, there was the intention to 
bombard a certain coastal town, it might be assumed that English 
fighting forces would at once rush out from different harbors where 
they were lying to drive off or capture the disturbers of their peace. 
If U-boats had been stationed off such towns, where it was pre- 
sumed there were enemy ships, they would probably have a chance of 
attacking. 

"Consideration was given as to what would be the most desirable 
way to station U-boats off enemy harbors; how they could be used 
in the form of movable mine-barriers, as flank protection, or other- 
wise render assistance. . . ." 



[57] 



Ill 

THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE 

The battle of Jutland is conveniently divided into 
the following five phases (each of these will be 
considered separately and in turn) : 

First Phase: (2:00 P.M. to 4:55 P.M.) 

Bj'itish Advance Force under Beatty encotmters 
German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper 
leads the action to the southeast and effects junc- 
ture with the High Sea Battle Fleet under Scheer, 
(Diagrams 9 and 10.) 

Second Phase: (4:55 P.M. to 6:40 P.M.) 

British Advance Force engaged with van of Ger- 
man High Sea Fleet; Beatty leads action to north 
and effects juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jelli- 
coe deploys the battle fleet and Scheer withdraws to 
the southwest. (Diagram 15.) 

Third Phase: (6:40 P.M. to 7:17 P.M.) 

Scheer turns hack and attacks the British center 
with guns and torpedoes. After a brief engage- 
[58] 



THE PHASES OF THE BATTLE 

ment Scheer again withdraws to the west under 
cover of a smoke screen. {Diagram 20.) 

Fourth Phase: (7:17 P.M. to 9:00 P.M. Dark.) 

In the gathering twilight Scheer, avoiding action, 
hauls around from west to southeast, and seeks 
to draw closer to Horn Reefs. Jellicoe tries to re- 
gain touch on westerly courses, then turns to the 
southwest, and finally to south. (Diagram 22,) 

Fifth Phase: (9:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M.) 

During the night Jellicoe withdraws to the south 
while Scheer steers for Horn Reefs. British light 
forces are intermittently engaged with the High 
Sea Fleet. (Diagram 24.) 

The day of the battle was partly cloudy to over- 
cast, but the sun broke through in places most of 
the time. Except for a moderate swell the sea was 
smooth. There was very little wind. Visibility was 
reported as good in the first stages of the action, but 
later in the afternoon was considerably reduced by 
mist and smoke which hung low in the heavy atmos- 
phere. 

Note: The tracks of the heavy ships throughout the battle are 
shown in Diagrams Nos. 9, 10, 15, 20, 22, and 24 of the five phases. 
Important situations during these phases are portrayed in more de- 
tail by position diagrams which also show light forces. These dia- 
grams have been constructed by combining data gleaned from the 
writings of Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Scheer, Commander von Hase, 
Gunnery Officer of the Derringer, and other authoritative sources, 
both British and German. No attempt has been made to plot in all 
the light forces. The positions of these are given approximately to 
indicate how the destroyers and light cruisers entered as factors, 
influencing the major tactics of the battle. 

[59] 



IV 

THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE 
(2:00 P. M. to 4:55 P. M.) 

British Advance Force under Beatty encounters 
German Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper 
leads the action to the southeast and effects junc- 
twe with the High Sea Battle Fleet wnder S cheer. 
(Diagrams 9, 10.) 

In the early afternoon of the day of the battle 
the western destroyers of Hipper's advanced scout- 
ing line were diverted to the left to examine a 
steamer. This proved a small incident carrying in 
its train large events. While so engaged these Ger- 
man destroyers made smoke contact with Beatty 's 
eastern scout. A few minutes before this contact, 
the British Advance Force had turned to the north 
and as Beatty and Hipper were then on about 
parallel courses they would have just cleared each 
other had it not been for the timely appearance of 
this neutral steamer. Both sides proceeded at once 
to develop this contact, and by 2:30 Beatty and 
Hipper knew by radio of the presence of enemy 
light forces. Jellicoe also received the report and 
directed Hood to proceed with the three battle 
cruisers under his command to head off the enemy 
[60] 



evAKTnoMAa 



J,* «s"^ 





mppea 

KATTf 



Diagram No. 9 

TRACK OF THE BATTLE CRUISERS DURING THEIR BATTLE 

APPROACH (2:00 TO 3:48 p.m., 31 may) 

[61] 







BEATTf 



4- S 6 V e d 10 



MILES, 



SCftCER 



Diagram No. 10 

track of the heavy ships during the first phase 
(2:00 P.M. to 4:55 p.m.) 

British Advance Force under Beatty encounters German 
Advance Force under Hipper. Hipper leads the action 
to the southeast and effects juncture with the High Sea 
Battle Fleet under Scheer 

[63] 



THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE 

should he attempt to escape via the Skaggerak. 
Hipper headed to the west and northwest to inves- 
tigate. Beatty turned to the southeast to cut off 
the enemy in case he attempted to retire toward 
the Horn Reefs passage. Shortly after 2:30, 
Beatty was informed of the presence of Hipper's 
heavy ships. As the opposing battle cruisers ap- 
proached each other the light forces became en- 
gaged, and the battle had begim. 

In this approach (Diagram 9) Beatty maneu- 
vered at a speed of nineteen and one-half knots. 
When assured of bringing the German ships to 
action, he changed from southeasterly courses and 
steered to the northeast toward the enemy. One 
hour later, at 3:25, Hipper's battle cruisers were 
sighted to the east, distant fifteen miles. By this 
time Beatty had concentrated his six battle cruisers, 
but, although the British had been maneuvering at 
a speed of only 19.5 knots, the four fast battleships 
under Evan-Thomas were still five miles away to 
the northwest. Admiral Beatty evidently esti- 
mated his battle cruisers as a sufficiently powerful 
force to destroy Hipper's ships unassisted. The 
British Admiral now increased speed to twenty-five 
knots, took a line of bearing formation to clear the 
smoke, and attacked. Hipper turned to the south- 
east. This placed the two columns about twelve 
miles apart on converging courses. When a little 
over eight miles from each other both sides opened 
fire simultaneously at 3:48. (Diagram 11.) 

[65] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

Admiral Evan-Thomas with his slower squadron 
of four battleships was now endeavoring to close 
up. He was so far astern, however, that he was 
unable to take an effective part in this first phase 
of the battle, and failure to concentrate before at- 
tacking proved costly to the British. The German 
fire was rapid and accurate. The Lion was hit twice 
three minutes after fire was opened and within ten 
minutes the roof of one of her turrets was blown 
off and two guns put out of action. By this time 
the Tiger and Princess Royal had also been hit and 
in a few minutes the Indefatigable was overwhelmed 
by a salvo. She fell out of line, sinking by the 
stern, was hit by another salvo forward, turned over 
and sank at 4:04. The range was now opening. 
Beatty had altered course to the south to confuse 
the enemy's fire control, and also to give Evan- 
Thomas opportunity to get into action by cutting 
a corner. (Diagram 12.) At 4:08 the Derfflinger 
ceased firing. Her target ship was out of range. 
(The Derfflinger s limit of gun elevation was for 
20,000 yds. ) There was now a brief lull in the en- 
gagement between the battle cruiser lines. 

At this time Evan-Thomas's battleships were 
able to open at the extreme range of 19,000 yards 
to 20,000 yards on the Von der Tann, Hipper's rear 
ship. At 4:16 the second ship from the rear was 
also taken under fire by the battleships, but, partly 
due to smoke, and partly to unfavorable light con- 
ditions to the eastward, difficulty was experienced 
[66] 



"^. \2nd Scouting 



tvM<-mcn\5 



npoo 



BEATTY 






V. 



^^ 



ntppKE 



N 



leooo 
JfOnfe. 



x/** 



V 



\ 



Diagram No. 11 

at 3:48 the opposing battle cruisers open fire 

[67] 



THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE 

in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being 
visible at a time. That the fire of Evan-Thomas's 
battleships was of slight effect is shown by the fact 
that the target ships of these battleships suffered 
little damage during this run to the south. 

Beatty and Hipper soon closed again, and, as the 
range decreased, the battle cruiser big gun action 
was renewed. Hipper's third ship was seen to be on 
fire. The gunnery officer of the Derfflinger re- 
ported that the Lion had temporarily left the line, 
and that this had caused him to shift his fire from 
the Princess Royal to the Queen Mary. The latter 
was thus under the concentrated fire of the Derf- 
flinger and the Seydlitz. At 4:26, after having 
been hit repeatedly, the Queen Mary sank in a ter- 
rific explosion, evidently caused by the blowing up 
of a magazine. The Tiger, following close astern, 
passed through a dense cloud of smoke and a great 
deal of debris fell on her decks, but except for this 
the Queen Mary had completely disappeared. This 
happened 38 minutes after the engagement started 
and 20 minutes after the loss of the Indefatigable. 
Eighteen of the Queen Mary's complement of 1,300 
men*were subsequently picked up by a destroyer. 

At 4:15 about twelve British destroyers moved 
out to attack Hipper's line. At the same time 
about eleven German destroyers also advanced to 
attack the British line. These light forces met in 
close range action between the lines. A German 
light cruiser and several supporting destroyers 

[69] 



WHAT HAPI^ENED AT JUTLAND 

joined in this engagement. The Germans fired 
twelve torpedoes at British capital ships at dis- 
tances ranging from 10,000 to 8,000 yards. Evan- 
Thomas turned his battleships away to avoid them 
— ^two torpedoes were seen to cross his track. The 
British destroyers also fired torpedoes, for the most 
part at a range of about 7,000 yards, and Hipper 
turned his ships away to escape them. (Diagram 
13.) Most of these torpedoes were fired between 
4:30 and 4:45. 

It was reported that the swell handicapped the 
speed of the German destroyers. This may account 
for the fact that only about eleven of the thirty- 
three destroyers with Hipper took part in the at- 
tack. On the British side about twelve out of 
thirty-one took part. Also, the destroyers on both 
sides apparently did not get far enough ahead to 
push home an effective close range torpedo attack. 
Although no torpedoes hit, they exerted an impor- 
tant influence on the battle tactics at a critical part 
of the gun-fire action by causing ships of both sides 
to turn away and open the range just as S cheer's 
battleship fleet was effecting juncture with Hip- 
per's battle cruisers. 

At 4:30 Scheer sighted the fighting battle cruiser 
lines to the north by west. At 4:38 one of the 
British advance light cruisers, the Southampton, 
reported the High Sea Battle Fleet to Beatty. 
Jellicoe and Hood, now advancing at their best 
speed to reenforce Beatty, also received this report. 
[70] 



v\lst.L.C.* 



\ 



\3Td.LCS. 



\?,nd.Scovrt(nqt^ 



\ 



\ EVAN "monAa 
Copm5 uvu) 



\9000 ^ord^ 



\ mpptB 



\ 

t 

^ lnCle,faVtgabl& 
• 5unk4-06 



T 
V-ndLCS 



^0.000 
^rd&. 






; 



Diagram No. 12 



AT 4:08 ADMIRAL BEATTY INCREASES THE RANGE AND 
ADMIRAL EVAN-THOMAS CLOSES ENOUGH TO OPEN FIRE 
AT LONG RANGE 



[71] 



THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE 

Beatty stood on until he sighted Scheer's van at 
4:42, when he turned the battle cruisers sixteen 
points in succession to starboard. At this time Hip- 
per was about 20,000 yards away and Beatty was 
not under an effective fire, A few minutes later 
Hipper turned his ships around and took station 
ahead of Scheer's van. The German battle fleet 
was now on course N.N.W., in line of divisions 
north, engaging the British battle cruisers at a 
range of 19,800 yards. Hipper was ahead of 
Scheer to the north, also firing at Beatty's and 
Evan-Thomas's ships at a range of 15,400 to 16,400 
yards. At 4 :49 five German destroyers tried, with- 
out success, to attack with torpedoes. A little after 
5 :00, two British destroyers also fired torpedoes at 
Hipper's ships, but without effect. At 4 :53 Evan- 
Thomas's ships, after engaging Hipper on an op- 
posite course, also countermarched, and turned up 
astern of Beatty. This placed the heavier ships in 
a favorable position to fight a rear guard action 
against the van of Scheer's column. (Diagram 
14.) 

Just before and during this turn, Evan-Thomas 
reported that the light was in favor of the enemy, 
and that the British battleships could only lay on 
and fire at the gun flashes, visibiUty being twelve 
miles to the west and six miles to the east. The 
smoke made by the destroyers during their attack 
hung between the lines and helped decrease the visi- 
bility. This, in addition to the opened range, due 

[73] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

to the "turn away" maneuvers to evade torpedoes, 
caused the gun-fire of both sides to be ineffective. 
Otherwise, this juncture with Scheer might have 
proved a critical period for Beatty's force. Upon 
the arrival of the High Sea Battle Fleet, Beatty 
had no alternative; he had to withdraw his ships. 
At the time he countermarched, had the Germans 
been pressing him closely, considerable damage 
might have been done the British force, as the 
maneuver is an awkward one to perform under 
heavy gun-fire. This marks the end of the first 
phase of the battle. 

Before turning to the second phase, it should be 
pointed out that Scheer had a plan to envelop 
Beatty's force between the German battleships and 
Hipper's battle cruisers. This plan was abandoned 
during the approach. 

The first contact with light forces had been re- 
ported to Scheer at 2:30. He had continued the 
German Battle Fleet on a north course until he 
received a second radio report from Hipper that 
British battle cruisers had been sighted. Scheer 
then closed his line into battle formation, 500 meters 
(545 yards) between ships and 1,000 meters (1,090 
yards) between squadrons, cleared his ships for ac- 
tion, increased speed to fifteen knots, and changed 
course first to the northwest, then to the west. 
Scheer has explained his plan and estimate as 
follows : 
[74] 



V"*-- 



*'^, 



P) 



/ JtVAMTHOMAS 






..— >-' 



Vrippst?. turns Qwav/ to 
^ "^ ^^ avoid torpeidioes. 



,'(Tui-ns away to avoid torpedoes) ^ 



V 17000 V^5. 



\ tP^\^f 




Nomad crippled 



Nestor crjppled'* 



Nicafor 




20000 

^ards 



HlPPEiR 



-^'' 



\ \ 



\ 



"4 



\BBATTYs^ 



Diagram No. 13 

4:30 TO 4:45 both sides, deliver torpedo attacks 

[75] 



THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE 

"The message received at 3:45 P.M. from the 
Chief of Recomiaissance that he was engaged with 
six enemy battle cruisers on a southeasterly 
course showed that he had succeeded in meeting the 
enemy, and as he fought was drawing him closer to 
our Main Fleet. The duty of the Main Fleet was 
now to hasten as quickly as possible to support the 
battle cruisers, which were inferior as to material, 
and to endeavor to hinder the premature retreat of 
the enemy. At 4:05, therefore, I took a north- 
westerly course at a speed of fifteen knots, and 
a quarter of an hour later altered it to a westerly 
course in order to place the enemy between two 
fires, as he, on his southerly course, would have 
to push through between our line and that of the 
battle cruisers." 

The plan to envelop Beatty was abandoned when 
Scheer received word that the six British battle 
cruisers were being supported by battleships. Of 
his new estimate and changed decision Scheer 
writes: 

"While the Main Fleet was still altering course, 
a message came from Scouting Division Two that 
an English unit of battleships, five ships, not four 
[Scheer then supposed that there were five instead 
of four battleships engaged], had joined in the 
fight. The situation thus was becoming critical for 
Scouting Division One (Hipper's battle cruisers), 

[77] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

confronted as they were by six battle cruisers and 
five battleships. Naturally, therefore, everything 
had to be done to get into touch with them and a 
change was made back to a northerly course. . . ." 

When Scheer made this estimate and decided to 
change his plan of approach, he had not heard of 
the destruction of the Indefatigable and Queen 
Mary. This news did not reach him until night. 
He evidently drew an erroneous picture of Hipper 
as hard pressed by the superior British force, 
whereas, in fact, as has been seen, he was doing very 
well. Under the altered plan the juncture was ef- 
fected in such a way that Beatty succeeded in ex- 
tricating his ships without further loss. 

In looking back at the positions of Hipper and 
Beatty at 2 :30, it would appear a fair criticism to 
observe that Hipper was then in grave danger of 
being cut up by the greatly superior force under 
Beatty and Evan-Thomas. The British, however, 
did not concentrate this superior force against Hip- 
per's command and, as a consequence, Evan- 
Thomas took no very effective part in the first phase 
of the action, and Hipper succeeded in getting well 
out of a difficult position. 

Again, viewing the 4 :30 situation in the light of 
S cheer's plan, the question may be raised as to 
whether or not the tables had then been turned. 
Had Beatty allowed himself to be drawn into a 
position where he might have been cut off and de- 
[78] 



THE BATTLE: FIRST PHASE 

stroyed by Scheer and Hipper? Scheer's inten- 
tion, as above stated, was to lead the Battle Fleet 
west of Beatty, allowing him to proceed on to the 
south in pursuit of Hipper until the British could 
be pinched between two fires. It is interesting to 
speculate as to what might have happened had 
Scheer persisted in this plan. It cannot be denied 
that risks were taken, in the first place by Hipper, 
and in the second place by Beatty. But war can- 
not be waged without running risks. 



[79] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

(4:55 to 6:40) 

'British Advance Force engaged with van of Ger- 
man High Sea Fleet; B catty leads action to north 
and effects juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jelli- 
coe deploys the battle fleet and Scheer withdraws 
to the southwest. (Diagram 15. ) 

Sighting Scheer's battleships presented to Beatty 
an enlarged situation. Up to now, his objective 
had been to cut off and destroy Hipper's detach- 
ment. The unexpected advent of Scheer, however, 
made the destruction of the German battle fleet 
the primary objective. Henceforth, Beatty's es- 
sential mission was to maintain contact with Scheer 
and keep Jellicoe informed of the enemy's course, 
speed and formation, so that the Grand Fleet might 
be brought into action quickly and effectively. 

Admiral Jellicoe, at 2 :30, upon receiving the first 
report that enemy light cruisers and destroyers had 
been sighted, had directed Hood to proceed with 
his three battle cruisers to head off the enemy should 
he try to escape through the Skaggerak. The bat- 
tle fleet had ceased zig-zagging and had increased 
[80] 



:^ 



^/fZfld.Scoutinq £)k 



HlPPbR. 




Diagram No. 14 



AT 4:55 P.M. ADMIRAL BEATTY TAKES NORTHWEST 
COURSE, AND ADMIRAL SCHEER JOINS IN BATTLE 



[81] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

speed. A little over an hour later Jellicoe heard 
of the presence of Hipper's battle cruisers. At 
4 :00 P.M. Hood's orders had been changed and he 
had been directed to reenforce Beatty. By 4:00 
P.M. the Battle Fleet was also closing the advance 
force at a speed of twenty knots. When Jellicoe 
received report that Beatty was in contact with the 
enemy battle fleet and retiring, the Grand Fleet 
was about 60 miles away to the N.N.W., and has- 
tening to the support of the battle cruisers at a 
speed of twenty knots. As Beatty was making 
twenty-five knots, the two forces, while on opposite 
courses, were coming together at the rate of forty- 
five sea miles an hour. (Diagram 15.) 

As Beatty hauled out of range at 5:15, Hipper 
shifted his fire to Evan-Thomas. This brought the 
four British battleships under the fire of Gve battle 
cruisers at about 16,000 yards, and also the van of 
the German battle fleet at about 18,500 yards. At 
5:20 Scheer ordered all fighting forces "to give 
chase." The ships of the Koenig class were able to 
make twenty-three knots for a short period and 
Evan-Thomas reported that at his best speed he had 
difficulty in drawing ahead. 

The two leading British battleships fired at Hip- 
per's ships and the two rear battleships fired at 
Scheer's van. The British do not record any par- 
ticular damage received at this time. During this 
phase the weather became less clear, and the wind 
shifted from N.W. to S.W. Powder fumes and 

[83] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

smoke hung over the sea and cut off the view to the 
north and east. Only now and then could Seheer 
see Hipper's ships. The light, however, was in 
favor of the Germans, being clearer to the west than 
to the east. At 5:30 Beatty gradually changed 
course to the right, and at 5:42, after having been 
out of action for half an hour, again opened fire 
on Hipper at about 14,000 yards, and during the 
next ten minutes the Lion alone fired some fifteen 
salvoes. Hipper also turned to the eastward on an 
interior concentric curve. 

Turning now to Hood, we find that, due to the 
previously-mentioned 12-mile discrepancy in navi- 
gation, he had missed juncture with Beatty and, 
on a course S. by E., had passed to the eastward 
of the fighting area. At 5:30 Hood's western 
protective scout cruiser heard firing to the south- 
west and, in heading over to investigate, became 
engaged with Hipper's outpost light cruiser and 
destroyers. Hood then turned around to N.W. and 
at 5:55 opened an effective fire with his port bat- 
tery against the German light cruisers. During 
this cruiser fighting, four British destroyers at- 
tacked, and about the same time ten or twelve 
German destroyers advanced and fired torpedoes 
from within 60 h.m. (6,500 yards) of Hood's line. 
Hipper had turned his battle cruisers to starboard, 
away from the torpedo threat, and being further 
influenced by the poor visibility which made it dif- 
ficult to return Beatty's fire, Hipper continued to 
[84] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

maneuver to close the distance which had opened 
between him and S cheer. Hood's battle cruisers 
saw the German torpedoes and evaded them by in- 
dividual ship maneuvers, two ships turning away 
and one toward the menace. No torpedoes hit. 
The German light cruiser Wiesbaden was disabled. 
The British destroyer Shark was disabled and later 
sunk. The Chester was damaged. The German 
light cruiser Pillau was also damaged. This con- 
tact with Hood gave the German command the im- 
pression that Jellicoe was approaching from the 
N.E. 

Almost simultaneously with Hipper's veer round 
to starboard, Admiral Scheer had observed that his 
leading battleships were turning to an easterly 
course in conformity to Beatty's change of direc- 
tion. The High Sea Fleet, during the chase to the 
north had opened out, and the faster divisions in the 
van had drawn ahead. Scheer now decided to re- 
form his line. The order "Leader in Front" was 
signaled at 5:45 P. M. (Diagram 16) and speed 
temporarily reduced to 15 knots to give the divi- 
sions a chance to get into position. Before 
Jellicoe arrived, therefore, Hipper had turned to 
close the High Sea Fleet, and had taken station 
just ahead of the battleships. Consequently Scheer 
had his fleet closed up and well in hand. This slow- 
ing down and maneuvering added to the difficulty 
Jellicoe and Beatty experienced in fixing the exact 
position of the High Sea Fleet. 

[85] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

The ensuing period was a crowded one. In addi- 
tion to the contacts between the light forces of 
Hood and Hipper, the outpost cruisers of Jellicoe 
had also become engaged. This juncture of forces 
on approximately opposite courses at high speeds 
caused events to follow in rapid succession. Both 
Jellicoe and S cheer had to do quick thinking and, 
in the midst of uncertainties, make important 
tactical decisions under a weight of responsibility 
as great as has ever been borne by any naval com- 
mander. In order to get a balanced conception of 
the tactics used, we shall try, fii*st, to look at them 
from the British Commander-in-Chief's point of 
view in the Iron Duke, and then transfer to the 
German flagship to get the other aspect of the 
situation as it appeared to Admiral Scheer. 

The British Commander-in-Chief, as he ap- 
proached the scene of action, was perplexed by 
meager and conflicting information. The plots on 
the chart from the reports of the JLion and South- 
ampton had led Jellicoe to expect contact ahead. 
There was, however, a discrepancy of at least 12 
miles in the navigation. This had already caused 
Hood to miss Beatty and pass by him to the east- 
ward. Moreover, another message from the South- 
ampton, as received on board the Iron Duke, said 
that the German battle fleet was to the northeast 
of the battle cruisers. This was an unlikely forma- 
tion. It was apparent that Hood would have 
sighted Scheer's battleships had it been the case, so 
[86] 




>IAGKAM No. 15 

lACK OF THE HEAVY SHIPS DUR- 
rG THE SECOND PHASE (4:55 P.M 

) 6:40 P.M.) 

British Advance Force engaged with van of German 
High Sea Fleet; Beatty leads action to north and effects 
juncture with Jellicoe and Hood. Jellicoe deploys the 
battle fleet and Scheer withdraws to the southwest 

[87] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

the report was discredited on the face of it as im- 
probable. Additional information was received by 
Jellicoe as follows: 

At 5:40 the Black Prince, the starboard wing 
armored cruiser, reported that battle cruisers were 
in sight bearing south, distant five miles. At 5 :45 
the Comus, stationed three miles ahead of the Battle 
Fleet, reported heavy gun-fire on a south bearing. 
Shortly after this, flashes of gun-fire were visible 
bearing S.S.W. At 5:50 Admiral Arbuthnot, com- 
manding the armored cruisers in the Defense, 
reported ships in action bearing S.S.W. and steer- 
ing N.E. At 5 -.55 the Marlborough reported gun 
flashes and heavy gun-fire on the starboard bow; 
at 5:56 strange vessels bearing S.S.W.; and at 6:00 
British battle cruisers bearing S.S.W., three to four 
miles distant. Shortly after 6:00 the Iron Duke 
sighted these vessels under Admiral Beatty about 
five miles away on an easterly course. (Diagram 
17.) 

The British tactics and the estimates that led 
to them are described by Admiral Jellicoe in the 
below-quoted passages: 

"At this stage, shortly after 6:00 P.M., there 
was still great uncertainty as to the position of 
the enemy's Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire were 
visible from ahead round to the starboard beam, 
and the noise was heavy and continuous. Our 
cruisers ahead seemed to be hotly engaged, but 

[89] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

the fact that they were not closing the Battle Fleet 
indicated to me that their opponents could hardly 
be battleships. 

"In order to take ground to starboard, with a 
view to clearing up the situation without altering 
the formation of the Battle Fleet, a signal had 
been made to the Battle Fleet at 6:02 P.M. to 
alter course leaders together, the remainder in 
succession, to south (a turn of three points). 
Speed at the same time was reduced to 18 knots 
to allow of the ships closing up into station. 

"The conflicting reports added greatly to the 
perplexity of the situation, and I determined to 
hold on until matters became clearer. The con- 
viction was, however, forming in my mind that I 
should strike the enemy's Battle Fleet on a bearing 
a little on the starboard bow, and in order to be 
prepared for deployment I turned the Fleet to 
a southeast course, leaders together and the re- 
mainder in succession, and the destroyer flotillas 
were directed by signal at 6:08 P.M. to take up 
the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. (Diagram 
18.) There was, however, a very short interval 
between this signal to the destroyers and the signal 
for deployment, and consequently the destroyers 
did not reach their positions before deployment. 
The subsequent alterations of course to the south- 
ward and westward added to their difficulties and 
delayed them greatly in gaining their stations at 
the van of the Fleet after deployment. . . . 
[90] 




f 

■yChestw 






Diagram No. 16 

AT 5:45 P.M. ADMIRAL HOOD's LIGHT FORCES ENGAGE 
ADMIRAL HIPPER's ADVANCE SCOUTS. — IN THE MEAN- 
WHILE SCHEER SLOWS DOWN AND REFORMS HIS FLEET 



[91] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

"At 6:01 p.m., immediately on sighting the 
LioUj a signal had been made to Sir David Beatty 
inquiring the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet. 
This signal was repeated at 6:10, and at 6:14 P.M. 
he signalled: 'Have sighted the enemy's Battle 
Fleet bearing south-southwest.' This report gave 
me the first information on which I could take 
effective action for deployment. . . . The enemy 
battle fleet position given placed it thirty degrees 
before the starboard beam of the Iron Duke, or 
fifty-nine degrees before the starboard beam of the 
Marlborough, and apparently in close proximity. 
There was no time to lose, as there was evident 
danger of the starboard wing column of the Battle 
Fleet being engaged by the whole German Battle 
Fleet before deployment could be effected. So at 
6:16 P.M. a signal was made to the Battle Fleet 
to form line of battle on the port wing column, on 
a course southeast by east, it being assumed that 
the course of the enemy was approximately the 
same as that of our battle cruisers. Speed was at 
the same time reduced to 14 knots to admit of our 
battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet, 
as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet 
being blanketed by them." (Diagram 17.) 

Before considering the German point of view, 
in order more clearly to understand Admiral 
Scheer's decisions, it might be well to explain that 
the High Sea Fleet had been drilled to perform a 

[93] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

certain withdrawing maneuver generally regarded 
in British naval circles as dangerously difficult if 
not quite impracticable to execute under gun-fire. 
This maneuver, by which Scheer hoped to retire 
the inferior High Sea Fleet whenever the superior 
British gun-fire became too hot, was a simultaneous 
"swing-around" of all ships under cover of a smoke 
screen made by cruisers and destroyers. Admiral 
Scheer had carefully exercised his fleet in this 
maneuver so that the ships could perform it, 
whether they were all on the same course in a 
straight battle line, or steering various courses dis- 
posed on a curved battle line.* In short the Ger- 
mans had a definite offensive-defensive plan of 
battle and the High Sea Fleet had been assiduously 
rehearsed in a novel method of attack and with- 
drawal. 

At this stage of the battle, shortly before 6:00, 
Admiral Scheer explains his estimate and decisions 
as follows: 

"While this encounter with the advance guard 
of the English Main Fleet was taking place, we, 
on our flagship, were occupied debating how much 
longer to continue the pursuit in view of the ad- 
vanced time. There was no longer any question 
of a cruiser campaign against merchantmen in the 
Skaggerak, as the meeting with the English fight- 

* Scheer himself says: "At our peace maneuvers great importance 
was always attached to their being carried out on a curved line and 
every means employed to insure the working of the signals." 

[94] 



yjnucot: ,--'' 






**--^5>„J'«?^i 



9\ 



|Black\ 






hebrtjammwi-' 



^ \. 



efcnco siifik. 



\ 




Vord. ,6<J0O f "Stow Crippled 

. \ ^Wiesbaden crippled 

\ I .-' ->-<c<^ 



J filBPER,' 



u 






X 



A 



^ftOOD 



?/t 



i 4Akpsta damaqed N 
x.ShorR crippled and later sunk 



Diagram No. 17 

at 6:16 p.m. admiral jellicoe deploys the british 
battle fleet to port and slows down, while ad- 
miral beatty closes german van at utmost speed 



[95] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

ing forces which was to result from such action 
had already taken place. But we were bound to 
take into consideration that the English Fleet, if 
at sea, which was obvious from the ships we had 
encountered, would offer battle the next day. 
Some steps would also have to be taken to shake 
off the English light forces before darkness fell 
in order to avoid any loss to our Main Fleet from 
nocturnal torpedo-boat attacks. . . . 

"At 6:02 came a wireless: 'Wieshaden incap- 
able of action.' On receipt of the message I turned 
with the fleet two points to port so as to draw nearer 
to the group and render assistance to the Wies- 
baden/' 

Even at this late hour Admiral Scheer did not 
know of the close proximity of Jellicoe. The Ger- 
man Commander-in-Chief apparently felt that he 
could delay making his night dispositions long 
enough to help the Wiesbaden. Had he known 
that the fleet battle which he expected to take 
place the following day would be precipitated by 
his maneuver to the north, there is no evidence 
that he would have attempted to postpone the en- 
gagement. But in such circumstances the plight 
of the Wiesbaden would have hardly constituted 
a large enough consideration to influence the tactics 
of the major fleet, unless it so happened that going 
to her assistance fitted in with the plan of battle. 

This maneuver toward the Wiesbaden brought 

[97] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

the British ships under Beatty and Evan-Thomas 
into Scheer's view as well as the confused cruiser 
fighting to the north and northeast. Another 
message from destroyers ahead reported twenty 
British battleships following a southeast course. 
Admiral Scheer thus describes the 6:16 circum- 
stances : 

"It was now quite obvious that we were con- 
fronted by a large portion of the English Fleet, 
and in a few minutes their presence was notified 
on the horizon directly ahead of us by rounds of 
firing from guns of heavy cahber. The entire arc 
stretching from north to east was a sea of fire. The 
flashes from the muzzles of the guns were distinctly 
seen through the mist and smoke on the horizon, 
though the ships themselves were not distinguish- 
able. 

"There was never any question of our line veer- 
ing round to avoid an encounter. The resolve to 
do battle with the enemy stood firm from the first. 
The leaders of our battleship squadrons, the Fifth 
Division, turned at once for a running fight, carried 
on at about 13,000 m. (14,200 yds.). The other 
divisions followed this movement on orders sig- 
nalled from the flagship." 

Just before the opposing battleship squadrons 

became engaged, Arbuthnot's armored cruisers 

stationed ahead of Jellicoe, while pressing after 

enemy light forces, had become involved with the 

[98] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

capital ships. Three of these had crossed ahead 
of Beatty and had turned up on an opposite course 
between the lines coming under the fire of Scheer's 
fleet. The flagship Defense was sunk; the Black 
Prince was badly damaged and during the follow- 
ing night was destroyed by German battleships; 
the Warrior was disabled and later abandoned in 
a sinking condition. 

Beatty, upon sighting Jellicoe to the north, 
crossed ahead of him on easterly courses at utmost 
speed. Hood, now approaching on a northwest 
course, sighted Beatty at 6:10, and eleven minutes 
later, in obedience to orders signalled by Beatty, 
counter-marched, taking station ahead of the Lion 
and engaging Hipper on an east-southeast course. 
At 6:25 Hood had closed Hipper to 8,000 yards, 
and at 6 :33 his flagship, the Invincible, was sunk by 
gun-fire. At about the same time Hipper's flag- 
ship, the lAtzow, was heavily hit and put out of 
action. 

In the meanwhile, the British battleships had 
become engaged during deployment. At 6:19 
Evan-Thomas, who was following at some distance 
behind Beatty, realized that the battleship fleet 
was deploying on the port wing and, in order not 
to blanket fire by crossing ahead, decided to make 
a wide turn to the left and form astern of Jellicoe's 
battleships. The War spite's helm had jammed 
just before this and she made a complete circle to 
starboard toward the enemy line. Although put 

[99] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

out of action by the concentrated German fire, she 
succeeded subsequently in reaching port. At 6 :17, 
before turning to port to dei)loy, the Marlborough 
division opened fire on German ships of the Kaiser 
class at a range of 13,000 yards. By 6 :30 the en- 
gagement had become general and the Grand Fleet 
deployment was completed at 6:38. (Diagram 

19.) 

Scheer was now in the disadvantageous position 
of being capped by a greatly superior force. This 
was a contingency, however, for which he had pre- 
pared the previously-mentioned "swing-around" 
withdrawing maneuver. The tactics used are de- 
scribed in the following excerpts from Admiral 
Scheer*s account of the battle: 

"I observed several enemy hits and consequent 
explosions on the ships at our leading point. Fol- 
lowing the movement of the enemy they had made 
a bend which hindered free action of our Torpedo 
Boat Flotilla II stationed there. 

"I could see nothing of our cruisers, which were 
still farther forward. Owing to the turning aside 
that was inevitable in drawing nearer, they found 
themselves between the fire of both lines. For this 
reason I decided to turn our line and bring it on 
to an opposite course. Otherwise an awkward 
situation would have arisen round the pivot which 
the enemy line by degrees was passing, as long dis- 
tance shots from the enemy would certainly have 
[100] 



eth.Dw. 5ltiOiv. ^tli.Div. Srd.Div 2nd.DiVi Jst.Div. 



J 



J I i- 



iFlotitio 
a miles •-leas 



'MARLBOROUGH 



IRONOUKC 



KlNGGtORGEV. 

X. 



"^^ 






Diagram No. 18 

beitish battleships in approach formation with 
destroyers in position no. 1 for deployment on 
left flank division 



[101] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

hit our rear ships. As regards the effectiveness 
of the artillery, the enemy was more favorably 
situated, as our ships stood out against the clear 
western horizon, whereas his own ships were hidden 
by the smoke and mist of the battle. A running 
artillery fight on a southerly course would there- 
fore not have been advantageous to us. The swing 
around was carried out in excellent style. At our 
peace maneuvers great importance was always at- 
tached to their being carried out on a curved line 
and every means employed to ensure the working 
of the signals. The trouble spent was now well 
repaid; the cruisers were liberated from their 
cramped position and enabled to steam away south 
and appeared as soon as the two lines were sepa- 
rated, in view of the flagship. The torpedo boats, 
too, on the lee side of the fire had room to move to 
the attack and advanced. 

"While the veering round of the line was pro- 
ceeding, two boats of Torpedo Boat Flotilla III 
(G-88 and V-73) and the leading boat of Tor- 
pedo Boat Flotilla I (S-32) had attacked. [It 
was probably one of these torpedoes that hit the 
Marlborough.] The remaining boats of the Tor- 
pedo Boat Flotilla had ceased the attack on an 
order to retire from the leader. The weakening 
of the enemy fire had induced the First Leader to 
give the order, being persuaded that the enemy 
had turned away and that the flotilla, which would 
be urgently needed in the further development of 

[103] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

the battle, would find itself without support. 
Owing to the shortening of the line at the head, 
the boats of the other flotillas were not able to 
attack. One division (Torpedo Boat Flotillas 
IX and VI) had just returned from the 6 o'clock 
attack. The enemy line did not follow our veer 
round. In the position it was to our leading point, 
it should have remained on, and could have held 
us still further surrounded if by a simultaneous 
turn to a westerly course it had kept firmly to our 
line. 

"It may be that the leader did nof grasp the 
situation, and was afraid to come any nearer for 
fear of torpedo attacks. Neither did any of the 
other officers on the enemy side think of holding 
firmly to our line, which would have greatly im- 
peded our movements and rendered a fresh attack 
on the enemy line extremely difficult. Immediately 
after the line was turned the enemy fire ceased 
temporarily." 

Although the British ships observed that their 
targets turned away, it does not appear that either 
Admiral Jellicoe or Admiral Beatty fully grasped 
this maneuver of the High Sea Fleet. In the dia- 
grams published in the official reports and also in 
Admiral Jellicoe's book, there is no indication of 
this simultaneous wheeling away of all ships in 
the German battle line. Doubtless the smoke made 
by the destroyers and cruisers prevented the 
[104] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

British from observing exactly what had hap- 
pened. The hght wind, now from the southwest, 
favored the Germans in their turn away movement 
as it left the British involved while Scheer quickly 
cleared it on his west course and was able to re- 
form his fleet in good visibility and clear of the 
enemy fire. 

As has already been remarked, the British in 
general had not regarded such a maneuver as a 
practicable one to perform under gun-fire. In ex- 
plaining the Grand Fleet movements Jellicoe has 
stated : 

"The objection to altering by turning all the 
ships together was the inevitable confusion that 
would have ensued as the result of such a maneuver 
carried out with a very large fleet under action 
conditions in misty weather." 

Admiral Scheer's prepared tactics, therefore, 
came as a surprise and were not only a complete 
success, but were undetected. The secret was kept 
and this meant that the same surprise maneuver 
might be repeated with equal chance of success. 

There was now a lull in the battle. Beatty 
hauled away to the east, reduced speed, and 
ordered the remaining two ships of Hood's squad- 
ron to take station astern. Jellicoe turned a few 
points to the right in an effort to regain touch, but 
it is obvious that much more radical maneuvering 
would have been required to hold the German 

[105] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

fleet under gun-fire. This ended the second phase 
of the battle. 

Although Admiral Jellicoe has stated that it had 
been foreseen that the Germans would employ with- 
drawing tactics under cover of smoke, it would 
appear that this particular simultaneous "swing- 
around" maneuver had not been anticipated, and 
that the British plan of battle did not afford an 
effective counter-stroke. 

This second phase of the battle raises many 
tactical questions. Coordination of forces — battle- 
ships, cruisers, and destroyers — ^in the preliminaries 
and during a fleet engagement presents intricate 
problems. Under the circumstances, it is not sur- 
prising that the somewhat dispersed British units 
under Jellicoe, Beatty, Hood, and Evan-Thomas, 
experienced difficulties. It is important, however, 
to examine these difficulties, and endeavor to read 
aright the lessons which they teach. 

In the first place, there was confusion and failure 
in the service of information. Information is the 
ground work upon which plans are constructed. 
Accuracy is vital, but the most accurate informa- 
tion is of no value if not received in time. Accurate, 
timely information bestows the power of initiative 
and surprise, which, if properly used, may be de- 
cisive factors. Victory may hinge upon the re- 
liability and opportuneness of the information re- 
ceived. 

[106] 






*"Ni 



13,000 

ards 




% '** — > 






>U6torp. \ /t 

7 ^ bunk 6-.35X nOOD 



\ ~- 




10.000 

yards 



AlPPER ^ 



Diagram No. 19 

at 6:35 p.m. admiral jellicoe completes his de- 
ployment and admiral scheer executes a "swing- 

AROUND" WITHDRAWING aiANEUVER 



[107] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

Up to this point in the action events have fol- 
lowed in logical sequence ; the advance forces made 
contact; the more powerful British detachment 
under Beatty compelled the weaker German squad- 
ron under Hipper to retire; Beatty was thus led 
to a contact with the High Sea Battle Fleet under 
Scheer; in turn, being pressed by the superior force 
under Scheer, Beatty retired toward Jellicoe; 
then, upon the arrival of Jellicoe, the inferior .Ger- 
man fleet employed retiring tactics. 

During the preliminaries the scout forces made 
and kept contact with Scheer, but accurate and 
timely information was not transmitted to Jellicoe. 
There were no linking up ships or other means em- 
ployed to guard against discrepancies in navigation, 
and it appears a fair criticism that system and 
method to assure the accomplishment of the scout 
mission were lacking. 

In addition to this failure of the advance recon- 
naissance force to accomplish fully its scout mis- 
sion, there was confusion in the conduct of the 
attached light forces in the immediate van of the 
British battle fleet. 

The light forces attached to a battle fleet have 
a two-fold function: First, to screen their own 
capital ships, denying information to the enemy, 
while at the same time they drive in the enemy's 
screen to get information of his main body; and 
second, to take such stations for action as will 
give opportunities for an offensive with torpedoes 

[109] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

against the enemy capital ships, while at the same 
time they are on guard to break up any contem- 
plated enemy destroyer and light cruiser attacks. 

At this juncture of the battle, the British light 
forces, instead of helping the major ships in ma- 
neuvering into action, actually hindered them. 
In pressing after the enemy, Arbuthnot's armored 
cruisers suddenly broke across Beatty's line of 
advance; the Defense, Warrior and Black Prince 
came up on an opposite course between the lines 
blanketing the fire of the battle cruisers, and there 
the Defense was sunk and the Warrior and Black 
Prince disabled, to no apparent useful purpose 
other than temporarily drawing the enemy's fire. 
German destroyers broke through the British light 
forces and reported to S cheer the presence of the 
British battle fleet. 

Turning now to the offensive function of the 
hght forces, we find that little was accomplished. 
When Hood first appeared he was compelled to 
evade by maneuvering the torpedoes fired by eleven 
German destroyers. Also Hipper turned back to 
close Scheer because of the menace of a British 
torpedo attack. Otherwise there was only desul- 
tory torpedo firing. There is no report of torpe- 
does being sighted by the capital ships of either side 
between 6:15 and 6:35, although conditions were 
favorable for destroyer work. The delay in order- 
ing the British battle fleet destroyers to their action 
[110] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

positions accounts for some of the lack of destroyer 
activity on the British side, and Scheer has stated 
that the radical changes of course to the right em- 
barrassed the German destroyers in the van. Only 
three German destroyers succeeded in attacking at 
about 6:30. One hit was scored on the Marl- 
borough. 

The British had a superiority of 36 cruisers 
against 11. The British destroyers were numer- 
ically about equal to the German, but the former 
were better gunned, larger and more seaworthy, 
although the German destroyers carried more tor- 
pedoes. Under the circumstances, it is a conspicu- 
ous fact that the British flotillas did not push home 
an attack on the German battleships either just 
before, or dm-ing, or immediately after, the "swing- 
around" maneuver. 

Of the British plan and doctrine for the de- 
stroyers. Admiral Jellicoe writes: 

"The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a 
great deal in the way of discussion and instructions 
on the subject of torpedo attack in a Fleet action. 
The duties of light cruisers and destroyers in this 
connection were dealt with at considerable length, 
and stress was laid on the supreme importance of 
both making early torpedo attacks on the enemy's 
line and of immediately countering such attacks, 
and it was pointed out that an early attack by our 
own destroyers would not only tend to stop an 

[111] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

enemy attack, but would place our attacking ves- 
sels in the best position to meet a hostile attack. 

"The battle stations of both light cruisers and 
destroyers were so fixed that they should be in the 
best positions to effect these two objects, such 
positions being obviously in the van of the Fleet; 
in order to provide against a 16-point turn on the 
part of the enemy, or deployment in the opposite 
direction to that anticipated, one or two flotillas, 
according to the numbers available, and a light 
cruiser squadron, were also stationed in the rear." 

Under this plan and doctrine it is difficult to 
understand why there was not greater offensive 
activity on the part of the British destroyers. It 
would appear that they were, for the most part, 
kept busy in trying to attain their assigned 
geometric battle stations. 

The method used in deploying the British Battle 
Fleet has been severely criticized. In defending 
it Admiral Jellicoe has presented the following 
argument : 

"My first and natural impulse was to form on 
the starboard wing column in order to bring the 
Fleet into action at the earliest possible moment, 
but it became increasingly apparent, both from 
the sound of gun-fire and the reports from the 
Lion and Barham, that the High Sea Fleet was in 
such close proximity and on such a bearing as to 
[112] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

create obvious disadvantages in such a movement. 
I assumed that the German destroyers would be 
ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that 
owing to the mist, the operations of destroyers at- 
tacking from a commanding position in the van 
would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to 
place the Battle Fleet in a position where it might 
be open to attack by destroyers during such de- 
ployment. 

"The further points that occurred to me were, 
that if the German ships were as close as seemed 
probable, there was considerable danger of the 1st 
Battle Squadron, and especially the MarlhorougJis 
Division, being severely handled by the concen- 
trated fire of the High Sea Fleet before the re- 
maining divisions could get into line to assist. In- 
cluded in the 1st Battle Squadron were several of 
our older ships, with only indifferent protection 
as compared with the German capital ships, and 
an interval of at least four minutes would elapse 
between each division coming into line astern on 
the 6th Division and a further interval before the 
guns could be directed on to the ship selected and 
their fire become effective. 

"The final disadvantage would be that it ap- 
peared from the supposed position of the High Sea 
Fleet, that the van of the enemy would have a very 
considerable 'overlap' if hne were formed on the 
starboard wing division, whereas this would not be 
the case with deployment on the port wing column. 

[113] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

The overlap would necessitate a large turn of the 
starboard wing division to port to prevent the 'T' 
being crossed, and each successive division coming 
into line would have to make this turn, in addition 
to the 8 point turn required to form the line. I 
therefore decided to deploy on the first, the port 
wing division. 

"The further knowledge which I gained of the 
actual state of affairs after the action confirmed 
my view that the course adopted was the best in 
the circumstances. 

"The reports from the ships of the starboard 
wing division show that the range of the van of the 
enemy's battle fleet at the moment of deployment 
was about 13,000 yards. The fleets were converg- 
ing rapidly, with the High Sea Fleet holding a 
position of advantage such as would enable it to 
engage effectively, first the unsupported starboard 
division, and subsequently succeeding divisions as 
they formed up astern. It is to be observed that it 
would take some 20 minutes to complete the 
formation of the line of battle. 

"The German gunnery was always good at the 
start, and their ships invariably found the range 
of a target with great rapidity, and it would have 
been very bad tactics to give them such an initial 
advantage, not only in regard to gunnery, but also 
in respect of torpedo attack, both from ships and 
from destroyers." 
[114] 



THE BATTLE: SECOND PHASE 

On the other hand, it has been said that this 
deployment sacrificed the advantage of surprise, 
delayed support to Beatty's hard pressed ships, 
and also surrendered to a certain extent the initia- 
tive. There is, perhaps, more than a modicimi 
of truth in this. Certainly, turning away from the 
enemy and slowing down cannot be characterized 
as highly aggressive tactics. But Admiral Jelli- 
coe's plan of battle was not an aggressive offensive. 
His plan was manifestly a cautious offensive and 
his deployment was made accordingly. From the 
beginning to the end of the battle the maneuvers 
of Admiral Jellicoe were consistently of a nature 
which can be described in a general way as tactics 
of a "cautious offensive." It should be understood 
that this was his plan of battle, and it is significant 
that it was officially approved by the Admiralty 
both before and after the battle. 

Notwithstanding this, and without presuming to 
pass judgment on the British plan of battle, it 
may be pointed out that there was lack of coor- 
dination in carrying it out at this critical juncture. 
Jellicoe slowed the battle fleet down and turned 
away; Hood and Beatty closed the enemy van at 
utmost speed; Evan-Thomas was in a quandary — 
the battle orders said in case of deployment away 
from Heligoland the fast battleship squadron will 
take station in the van — but this would have en- 
tailed crossing the entire front of the Fleet, so 
Evan- Thomas decided to make a wide sweep and 

[115) 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

turn up astern. As a consequence of all this, we 
find Beatty and Hood bearing the brunt of a close 
range fire without much support. Evan-Thomas's 
ships were hauled away from the engagement in 
maneuvering for position astern, and it is reported 
that battleships in the rear were temporarily slowed 
down and even stopped during the deployment. 
Shortly after 6:30, just as the deployment was 
completed, Scheer executed a simultaneous ship 
movement to the southwest, and, as the British 
battle plan did not provide any maneuver to hold 
the enemy in action, these evasion tactics of an in- 
ferior fleet with less speed were a complete success. 



[116] 



VI 

THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE 

(6:40 P.M. to 7:17 P.M.) 

Scheer turns back and attacks the British center 
with guns and torpedoes. After a brief engage- 
ment Scheer again withdraws to the west u/nder 
cover of a smoke screen. (Diagram 20.) 

Up to this time the battle had gone decidedly 
in favor of the Germans. Of the heavy ships, three 
British battle cruisers had been sunk, while on the 
German side, Hipper's flagship, the Liltzow, had 
been put out of action. The other battle cruisers 
had suffered some damage but still remained ef- 
fective fighting units. The Derfflinger, for ex- 
ample, although all of her turrets were ready to 
continue the action, had masts and rigging badly 
cut up, and her torpedo net had been shot away 
aft, in such a way that the ship had to be stopped 
in order to clear it from the port screw. It is sig- 
nificant that the Derfflinger was able to take ad- 
vantage of the lull in the battle after Scheer's 
withdrawing maneuver to accomplish this precari- 
ous operation unmolested. (This experience led 

[117] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

to the subsequent discard of these torpedo nets.) 
Hipper now decided to abandon the Liitzow and 
transfer his flag in a destroyer to another battle 
cruiser. He went first alongside the Seydlitz but 
was informed that her radio had been shot away. 
Before he could reach another ship the battle 
cruisers were engaged again, and it was not until 
9:00 P.M. that Hipper finally succeeded in get- 
ting on board the Moltke. In the meanwhile the 
Derfflinger^ under Captain Hartog, was directed to 
take the lead. 

The British forces were apparently baffled by 
the German tactics. At 6:50 Beatty slowed to 
18 knots and reformed his line with the two re- 
maining ships of Hood's squadron astern. It seems 
that the Lion passed the wreck of the Invincible 
twice, indicating a loop. Jellicoe's course on de- 
ployment was S.E. by E., but the van had hauled 
in to S.E., without signal, to close the enemy. At 
6:50 Admiral Jellicoe signaled to change course 
by divisions in succession to south. Several tor- 
pedoes were now seen crossing the track of the rear 
of the battle line. These were probably fired by 
the three destroyers which advanced to the attack 
just as S cheer executed his withdrawal maneuver. 
At 6 :54 one hit the Marlborough but she was able 
to retain station in the battle line. During the 
night she was compelled to proceed to port at re- 
duced speed. This was the only torpedo hit scored 
on a British capital ship. 
[118] 




EEATnr/ 



/7:n 



\ z 



8 10 
I , t 



Miu:'& 



Diagram No. 20 

track of the heavy ships during the third phase 
(6:40 P.M. TO 7:17 p.m.) 

Scheer turns back and attacks the British center with 
guns and torpedoes. After a brief engagement Scheer 
again withdraws to the west under cover of a smoke 



screen 



[119] 



THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE 

At 6:33 the speed of the battle fleet had been 
increased from 14 knots to 17 knots and this 
speed was maintained from now on throughout the 
day and night. The following extract from Ad- 
miral JeUicoe's book explains these speed decisions, 
which were part of the plan and doctrine of a cau- 
tious offensive that dominated the British battle 
fleet tactics throughout the engagement; 

"Experience at all Fleet Exercises had shown 
the necessity for keeping a reserve of some three 
knots of speed in hand in case of a long line of 
ships, in order to allow of station being kept in 
the line under conditions of battle, when ships were 
making alteration of course to throw out enemy's 
fire, to avoid torpedoes, or when other independent 
action on the part of single ships, or of divisions 
of ships, became necessary, as well as to avoid ex- 
cessive smoke from the funnels ; for this reason the 
Fleet speed during the action was fixed at 17 knots. 
In the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships had at 
times to steam 20 knots, showing the necessity for 
this reserve. Up to 7:10 P.M. also the torpedo 
flotillas were not in station ahead." 

These maneuvers of Jellicoe and Beatty would 
have proved ineffective to close the German Fleet 
had it not been for the fact that Scheer himself 
decided at this time to assume the offensive. This 
decision was remarkable in many respects. 

[121] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

The following statements of the German Com- 
mander-in-Chief merit close scrutiny: 

"It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If 
the enemy followed us our action in retaining the 
direction taken after turning the line would par- 
take of the nature of a retreat, and in the event 
of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet 
would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to de- 
cide on a line of action enforced by enemy pressure, 
and not adopted voluntarily, which would therefore 
be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still 
less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself 
from the enemy, leaving it to him to decide when 
he would elect to meet us next morning. There 
was but one way of averting this — to force the 
enemy into a second battle by another determined 
advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo boats to 
attack. The success of the turning of the line while 
fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, and 
decided me to make still further use of the facility 
of movement. The maneuver would be bound to 
surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest 
of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would 
facilitate the breaking loose at night. The fight 
of the Wiesbaden helped also to strengthen my 
resolve to make an effort to render assistance to 
her and at least save the crew. 

"Accordingly, after we had been on the new 
course about a quarter of an hour, the line was again 
[122] 



THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE 

swung round to starboard on an easterly course 
at 6:55 P.M. The battle cruisers were ordered to 
operate with full strength on the enemy's leading 
point; all the torpedo boat flotillas had orders to 
attack. 

"The battle that developed after the second 
change of course and led to the intended result 
very soon brought a full resumption of the firing 
at the van, which, as was inevitable, became the 
same running fight as the previous one, in order to 
bring the whole of the guns into action. This time, 
however, in spite of 'crossing the T,* the acknowl- 
edged purpose was to deal a blow at the center of 
the enemy line. The fire directed on our line by 
the enemy concentrated chiefly on the battle cruisers 
and the Fifth Division. The ships suffered all 
the more as they could see but little of the enemy 
beyond the flash of fire at each round, while they 
themselves apparently offered a good target for 
the enemy guns. The behavior of the battle 
cruisers is specially deserving of the highest praise, 
— crippled in the use of their guns by their numer- 
ous casualties, some of them badly damaged, obey- 
ing the given signal, 'At the enemy,' they dashed 
recklessly to attack." 

Scheer's turn to an easterly course quickly closed 
the British. At 7:05 Jellicoe had turned three 
more points to starboard to close, but at 7:10 enemy 
destroyers were seen approaching and a report 

[123] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

was received that a submarine had been sighted on 
the port bow and he brought the fleet back to course 
south again, "to turn on the submarine and bring 
the ships in line ahead ready for any required 
maneuver." (This report of a submarine was evi- 
dently an error as S cheer has stated no submarines 
were present. ) 

Scheer's attack landed a little abaft the British 
center. At 7:12 German battle cruisers emerged 
from the mist and smoke at a range of 10,000 
yards abeam of the Colossiis, the seventeenth bat- 
tleship in line. Four British battleships were now 
able to open an effective fire. The German van 
turned to a southerly course. At 7:14 Beatty re- 
gained touch, sighting two battle cruisers and two 
battleships at a range of 15,000 yards. The visi- 
bility conditions were to the advantage of the Brit- 
ish who were firing to windward at targets which 
had the western sky for a background. (Diagram 
20.) 

It is thus seen that the situation which now de- 
veloped was similar to that which existed at 6:35 
when S cheer executed his first withdrawal 
maneuver. The High Sea Fleet was again in the 
tactically disadvantageous position of being T'd 
by a superior force. This time the light conditions 
were very unfavorable for the Germans, and the 
High Sea Fleet was suffering severe damage while 
inflicting punishment on the enemy so slight as to 
be negligible. Admiral Scheer, therefore, at 7:12, 
[124] 






"J n 



S : 



« Wiesbaden ;* .•' 



^'^^ 15.000 yd 



^X^<--^ v/tLUCOD 



scnttR 






/">^ 






/' 



^&500yds. 



...'lOTZOW 



■^A w»o^ 



I- 



r:<lJt£aa?! 



Wjoooyla. 
>>-» Yi Plot Yl. ,q' / 






1/ i 

-^ 1 

V \ Y y, 

^N^ ♦ T 

.it ■ 

4 i \\ 



yBEAorr 



V 



/ ' 



Diagram No. 21 

at 7:17 admiral scheer, after attacking the 
british center, again executes his withdrawal 
maneuver 



[125] 



THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE 

made signal once more to perform the simultane- 
ous "swing-around" withdrawing maneuver. This 
was executed at 7:17 and the High Sea Fleet 
again hauled out of action on a westerly course. 
(Diagram 21.) At the time of turning, Scheer 
observed that his line was somewhat congested, 
the Friedrich der Grosse was approaching the 
pivot while the van squadron had already turned 
to the south; although the signal was flying to 
turn to starboard, Scheer ordered his flagship, the 
Friedrich der Grosse, to turn to port. His pur- 
pose was to afford more room for maneuvering, and 
with this modification, the "swing-around" was ex- 
ecuted without mishap. 

At 7:12, when Scheer made signal for the battle- 
ships to withdraw from the T-ing position, the 
cruisers and destroyers were signalled to push home 
a torpedo attack. The four remaining German 
battle cruisers, already heavily engaged in the van, 
continued to close the British line and provided 
a protecting curtain of fire for the attacking de- 
stroyers. Under cover of destroyer attack and 
smoke screen, the High Sea Battle Fleet was able, 
for the second time, and again without the exact 
nature of the maneuver being detected by the 
British, successfully to withdraw by simultaneously 
swinging the line to an opposite course. 

The German battle cruisers, however, were sub- 
jected to a severe fire and suffered heavily. In the 
Derfflinger, for example, at 7:13, a shell penetrated 

[127] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

one of the after turrets and exploded inside. The 
flames ignited a powder charge in the handling 
room but it burned without an explosion and did 
not reach the magazines. All but 5 of the turret 
crew of 78 were wiped out. It was only a few 
minutes later that another heavy shell penetrated 
the roof of the second after turret exploding in- 
side with much the same result, except that only 
one of the turret crew of 80 was saved. The ship 
was hit again and again. A direct heavy shell 
hit was scored on the conning tower, but did not 
penetrate. Of the broadside battery of six 15- 
centimeter guns, all but two were put out of action. 
Practically all communications were carried away, 
and the two remaining turrets fired independently 
under individual control. Three thousand four 
hundred tons of water entered the ship and fires 
were burning in numerous places. The light con- 
ditions were such, at this time, that the Germans 
could not see the British hulls and could only fire 
at the gun flashes. 

At 7:37 the cruisers had hauled out of action, 
all severely punished but, with the exception of 
the Liitzow, still in formation. The Seydlitz in 
particular was badly damaged, flames were leaping 
upward from one of her turrets, and she was well 
down by the head with several thousand tons of 
water on board. 

In the meanwhile, the German destroyers had 
advanced to attack in two waves. The first wave 
[128] 



THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE 

of ten to fifteen boats was sighted by Jellicoe at 
7:10 bearing S. 50° W. from the Iron Duke. 
Under a heavy fire they advanced to within 6,000 
to 7,000 yards of the center of the British battle- 
ship line, fired torpedoes, and retired making a 
dense smoke screen. One, the S-35, was sunk. 
At this time the British light forces had not yet 
reached their assigned positions in the van favor- 
able to counter the attack, so the battleship line 
was turned four points to port, away from the 
menace, to avoid the torpedoes. Of this maneuver 
Admiral Jellicoe writes: 

"At a sufficient interval before it was considered 
that the torpedoes fired by the destroyers would 
cross our fine, a signal was made to the Battle 
Fleet to turn two points to port by subdivisions. 
Some minutes later a report was made to me by 
Commander Bellairs (the officer on my Staff espe- 
cially detailed for this duty, and provided with an 
instrument for giving the necessary information) 
that this turn was insufficient to clear the torpedoes, 
as I had held on until the last moment; a further 
turn of two points was then made for a short time. 
As a result of this attack and another that fol- 
lowed immediately, some twenty or more torpedoes 
were observed to cross the track of the Battle 
Fleet, in spite of our turn, the large majority of 
them passing the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle 
Squadrons at the rear of the line. It was fortunate 

[129] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

that, owing to the turn away of the Fleet, the tor- 
pedoes were apparently near the end of their run, 
and were consequently not running at high speed. 
They were all avoided. ..." 

At 7:25 the second wave of attacking German 
destroyers, about 20 boats, advanced through the 
smoke; but by this time the British cruisers and 
destroyers were in position to meet them. Also 
the German capital ships had withdrawn and could 
not afford the cover of heavy gun-fire. Upon 
emerging from the smoke, the German destroyers, 
besides being jSred upon by the British battleships, 
were counter-attacked by British light forces and 
driven back before they could fire torpedoes at the 
battleship line. This ended the third phase of the 
battle. 

During this phase of the action it is again a con- 
spicuous fact that the British flotillas did not press 
home an attack against the German capital ships. 

The tactics used by Scheer illustrate clearly the 
German offensive-defensive battle plan — a surprise 
blow with the battleships and battle cruisers, sup- 
plemented by destroyer attack, and followed by a 
quick withdrawal executed under cover of a smoke 
screen. 

This does not mean, however, that Scheer fore- 
saw, or sought, the exact situation in which he 
found himself just before 7:00 P.M. On the con- 
trary, there is evidence that he considered the High 
[130] 



THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE 

Sea Fleet then in something hke a predicament.* 
Scheer had good cause to be satisfied with the results 
of the fighting up to that point, and it is quite pos- 
sible he would not have sought to reengage the 
British fleet had it not been for the fact that he was 
concerned to keep open his route of retirement 
toward Heligoland. For this reason, Scheer's 
estimate and consequent decision to return to the 
attack are particularly noteworthy. 

The German Commander-in-Chief did not wish 
to give Admiral Jellicoe the initiative in pressing 
the High Sea Fleet to the west by attacks during 
twilight, thus perfecting the British encircling 
maneuver, getting in position to harass the Ger- 
man Fleet with torpedoes during the dark hours 
and finally reengaging on terms of Admiral 
Jellicoe's choosing the next morning. Admiral 
Scheer, therefore, decided on a surprise attack 
aimed at the British center with a view to upsetting 
the British dispositions and plans to such an extent 
as would permit the High Sea Fleet to get clear 
and gain by daylight the Horn Reefs Passage 
where the advantage of position and initiative would 
be on the German side. Fortunately for the High 
Sea Fleet, its rehearsed battle maneuver was well 
adapted to this purpose. 

At first glance, it would appear questionable 
tactics deliberately to charge the center of the 

* The German Chief of Staff is quoted as saying that if any 
admiral had involved himself in such a position in peace time 
maneuvers he would never again have obtained a command afloat. 

[131] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

British line, thus placing the German Fleet in 
the disadvantageous position of being T'd by a 
superior force. The advantage of light to the 
British was an important consideration. As far 
as results in material damage were concerned, the 
Germans suffered heavily in this attack and the 
British practically not at all. It cannot be denied, 
however, that this aggressive maneuver, at least to 
a great extent, accomplished its purpose. The 
British fleet was pushed to the eastward: Scheer 
gained ground toward his base and was able to 
reach the shelter of his mine fields off Horn Reefs 
by daylight. It would appear that the results 
vindicated S cheer's decision. At the same time, 
it is to be remembered that this attack was not a 
pushed home oflfensive; it was only a limited of- 
fensive with a defensive objective. 

Since the situation which developed in the third 
phase of the fighting was similar to that of the 
second phase in its general aspects, it has followed 
that criticisms, resting on the same general grounds, 
have been made of the British tactics used in both 
these phases. It has been pointed out that, shortly 
after seven, as a result of Scheer's turn to the 
eastward toward the British, the High Sea Fleet, 
was placed under the guns of the Grand Fleet, 
and a second opportunity thus presented to destroy 
the slower inferior enemy force. Critics have 
argued that it was only necessary to follow the lead 
of Beatty's battle cruisers, hold firmly to the van, 
[132] 



THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE 

and develop an encircling maneuver from which 
Scheer would have been unable to escape.* To 
these critics Admiral Jellicoe has replied: 

"(a) The retiring fleet places itself in a position 
of advantage in regard to torpedo attack on the 
following fleet. The retiring fleet also eliminates, 
to a large extent, danger of torpedo attack by the 
following fleet. 

" ( & ) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet 
of drawing its opponent over a mine or submarine 
track. 

"(c) Smoke screens can be used with effect to in- 
terfere with the observation of gun-fire by the fol- 
lowing fleet. 

"(^) Considerations of moral effect will force 
stronger fleets to follow the weaker, and play into 
the hands of the enemy." 

Here again it can be seen that the controversy 
hinges on Admiral Jellicoe's plan of battle. His op- 
ponents claim that he should have used aggressive 
offensive tactics, while Admiral Jellicoe maintains 
that his plan and tactics of a cautious offensive 
were correct. 

The "turn-away" tactics to avoid torpedoes were 
a particular application of this doctrine, just as the 
method of deployment was another particular ap- 

* These critics attach much importance to Admiral Beatty's signal 
— "Urgent. Submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers. We 
can then cut off whole of enemy's battle fleet." 

[133] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

plication of the same doctrine — the cautious offen- 
sive. Admiral Jellicoe's arguments in justification 
of his tactics should be fully appreciated. In re- 
gard to the "turn-away" tactics to avoid torpedoes 
he writes : 

"When the first attack by German destroyers 
took place and the first of the enemy's flotillas was 
seen to be approaching on a bearing 30 degrees 
before the beam of the Iron Duke, and had reached 
a distance of 9,000 yards or less, the 'counter' of 
a turn toward or away was essential. Our own 
flotillas had been using every endeavor to get to the 
van, but the frequent turns to starboard and the 
movement of our battle cruisers across the bows 
of the battle fleet had delayed their movement, and 
it was evident that neither they nor the light cruis- 
ers could prevent the attack from developing. 

"The moment of discharge of torpedoes could 
not be determined with sufficient accuracy for a 
turn towards and therefore the Battle Fleet was 
turned away in subdivisions [of 2 ships each]. 

"It may be asked whether it was necessary to 
turn the whole line of battle away for this attack, 
or whether the leading squadron could not have 
held the original course. Such a movement was 
provided for in the Battle Orders, but the de- 
stroyers were observed at a range of 9,000 yards 
on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the 
Iron Duke, the leading ship of the center battle 
[134] 



THE BATTLE: THIRD PHASE 

squadron, and therefore the leading Battle Squad- 
ron was as open to attack by torpedoes as was the 
center or rear squadron ; indeed the destroyers were 
standing in a direction to attack the van squadron. 
The rear of the leading Battle Squadron was also 
not at the time clear of the van of the center 
squadron, as the turns that had been made had pre- 
vented line ahead being reformed, and the Iron 
Duke^s division could not turn unless the division 
ahead also turned. These facts strengthened the 
reasons which led me to make the signal general 
to the Battle Fleet. 

"The German torpedo attacks at Jutland did 
not produce any great effect, and their importance 
should not be exaggerated. The turn of the British 
Battle Fleet opened the range some 1,750 yards, 
but it was not this turn which led to the difficulty 
of keeping touch with the enemy. That difficulty 
was due to the fact that the German Fleet made 
a very large turn to the westward under cover of 
a smoke screen at the moment of launching the 
earliest destroyer attacks." 

This contention of Admiral Jellicoe that "the 
German torpedo attacks at Jutland did not pro- 
duce any great effect, and their importance should 
not be exaggerated" should be pondered by students 
of tactics. While the torpedo is an important 
weapon and, potentially rather than actively, took 
a significant part in the battle of Jutland, still the 

[135] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

admonition not to exaggerate its importance should 
be heeded. The torpedo was not the controlling 
factor. The controlling factors were the respective 
battle plans. With the German "offensive-de- 
fensive" pitted against the British "cautious of- 
fensive," it would have taken some stroke of 
fortune to bring the forces together in decisive 
battle. History has taught — no matter what the 
weapons may be, whether sailing ships with smooth 
bores or dreadnaughts with high power rifles — a 
"cautious offensive" never gives decisive results. 
It takes an "aggi-essive offensive" to gain complete 
victory, such as was Nelson's at Trafalgar. Nor 
can it be admitted that an "aggressive offensive" 
battle plan is impracticable with modern fleets and 
modern weapons. Whether an "aggressive offen- 
sive" by the British at Jutland would have ended 
in victory or defeat is, and must remain, subject 
matter for conjecture, but it is certain that one 
way or the other a definite decision would have 
resulted. 



[136] 



VII 

THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE 

(7:40 P.M. to 9:00 P.M., dark) 

In the gathering twilight Scheer, avoiding action, 
turns from west to southeast and seeks to draw 
closer to Horn Beefs. Jellicoe tries to regain touch 
on westerly/ courses, then turns to the southwest and 
finally to south. (Diagram 22.) 

Shortly after 7 :30 the German battle cruisers fol- 
lowed Scheer's battle fleet in withdrawing to the 
west under cover of smoke, and there was another 
lull in the fighting. The British battleships were 
not again engaged. By 7:33 Jellicoe had turned 
to a south by west course. At 7:41 a further 
change of 3 points to a southwest course was made. 
About this time, Beatty signaled that the enemy 
bore northwest by west from the Lion, distant 10 
to 11 miles, and that Lion's course was southwest. 
Other enemy battleships were observed to the west- 
ward of the Iron Duke, and at 8:00 the course of 
the fleet was changed by divisions to west to close 
them. Enemy destroyers were sighted to star- 
board of Jellicoe's line. British light cruisers, 

[187] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

while advancing to attack them, were engaged by 
enemy battleships. The Calliope fired a torpedo 
at the leading battleship, range 6,500 yards, and an 
explosion was heard. 

Had Jellicoe continued to the west, he would 
have regained touch with Scheer or forced him to 
move over to the west, but the mist and smoke, 
combined with the threat of torpedoes, influenced 
him, at 8:21, to turn the Grand Fleet two points 
to port for four minutes, then back to west for 
5 minutes, and at 8:30 to form column on course 
southwest. In like manner as they have con- 
demned the deployment of the second phase and 
the "turn away" to avoid torpedoes of the third 
phase, Admiral Jellicoe's critics have condemned 
these tactics as lacking aggressiveness — especially 
in view of the silhouette advantage on the British 
side. In fact, it would appear that the British 
had an excellent opportunity, even at this late 
hour, to engage Scheer under favorable conditions 
or to force him over to the west far enough to 
assure a battle the next morning before he could 
reach shelter off Horn Reefs. Whether right or 
wrong, it is to be noted that Admiral Jellicoe con- 
sistently held to his battle plan of a cautious of- 
fensive. (Diagram 23.) 

In the meanwhile, Beatty, after being out of 
touch since about 7:40, made contact with enemy 
battle cruisers at 8:22, holding them under an 
[138] 




Diagram No. 22 

track of the heavy ships during the fourth phase 
(7:17 P.M. TO 9:00 p.m. — Dark) 

In the gathering twilight Scheer, avoiding action, hauls 
around from west to southeast, and seeks to draw closer 
to Horn Reefs. Jellicoe tries to regain touch on westerly 
courses, then turns to the southwest and finally to south 

[139] 



THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE 

effective fire until 8:28 when they turned away. 
Admiral Scheer says of this brief encounter: 

". . . The ships, already heavily damaged, were 
hit again without being able to return the fire to 
any purpose. Nothing could be seen of the enemy 
beyond the flash of the guns at each round." 

It so happened that the German Squadron of 
predreadnaughts in maneuvering to take their 
station ahead of Squadron One, crossed between 
Hipper and Beatty at just this time and took the 
fire of the latter. As they were unable to return 
it effectively, they also hauled away to the west. 
Beatty, being unsupported, did not follow them. 
Up to now, these slower German ships had taken 
little part in the action and during the previous 
fighting had dropped astern. Jellicoe's surmise 
that the enemy fleet had become temporarily di- 
vided was correct. The German ships were last 
seen by the light cruiser Falmouth at 8:38. 

Turning now to the German maneuvers during 
this phase, it is seen that Scheer, after withdrawing 
to the west, soon changed to southerly courses. 
His aim was to prevent an encircling maneuver and 
to gain ground toward Horn Reefs so that he could 
surely reach there by daylight. Under cover of 
a smoke screen to leeward he kept over as far to 
the east as Beatty and Jellicoe would permit. At 
9 :00 P.M., the two fleets were barely out of sight 

[141] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

of each other when the dispositions for the night 
were made. 

Admiral JelHcoe describes the British night dis- 
positions as follows: 

"At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, 
and the threat of torpedo-boat-destroyer attacks 
during the rapidly approaching darkness made 
it necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for 
the night, with a view to its safety from such at- 
tacks, while providing for a renewal of action at 
daylight. I accordingly maneuvered to remain be- 
tween the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas 
in a position in which they would afford protection 
to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same 
time be favorably situated for attacking the enemy's 
heavy ships." 

Admiral Beatty made the following estimate: 

"In view of the gathering darkness and the fact 
that our strategical position was such as to make it 
appear certain that we should locate the enemy at 
daylight under most favorable circumstances, I 
did not consider it desirable or proper to close the 
enemy battle-fleet during the dark hours." 

The British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for 
not seeking a night action were: — first, that he did 
not wish to subject the battle fleet to night torpedo 
[142] 



r 



■ISquadron ' 

J Squadron / / .''"^''C 

SCHfctR. / -' ]!t / f 

/' / / / / 

" ■/ 1 i 

H Squadron y^ fl \ 

HIPPER ^-^ 




JfcLLicqp,- 




.-s^" 



/ 



Diagram No. 23 

at 8:30 p.m. admiral beatty is again engaged, 
admiral jellicoe turns to the southwest 



[143] 



THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE 

attack by the well equipped and efficient enemy- 
destroyer flotillas; second, that the German Navy 
had an advantage in night fighting, as they pos- 
sessed a superior searchlight system, supplemented 
by the star-shell, a better fire control installation, 
more effective explosive shell, and moreover, had 
demonstrated an ability to gain an initial advantage 
with their guns by greater accuracy and rapidity 
of fire; third, that British naval constructors had 
been restricted in giving the dreadnaughts beam by 
the size of their docks and that in compromising 
between long range gun power and armor protec- 
tion they had devoted a larger percentage of ton- 
nage to the former than had German naval con- 
structors, that this had made the British ships more 
vulnerable, while the German ships had better 
armor protection and watertight sub-divisioning at 
a proportionate sacrifice of gun power, and that 
while this condition might favor the British in a 
long range day action, it worked against them in a 
short range night action; and, fourth, that the ele- 
ment of chance enters into a night encounter, con- 
cerning which Admiral Jellicoe states that there 
was present in his mind "the necessity for not leav- 
ing anything to chance in a fleet action, because 
our fleet was the one and only factor that was vital 
to the existence of the Empire, as indeed of the 
Allied cause." 

The estimate that the strategic position of the 
British was such as to make it appear certain that 

[145] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

the enemy would be located at daylight under 
favorable circumstances, seems to have been made 
on an erroneous assumption as to the position of 
the High Sea Fleet, although it is not clear why 
either force should have been deceived as to the 
approximate location of the other. Since Admiral 
Jellicoe did not wish to fight a night action nor an 
early morning twilight action in the vicinity of 
Horn Reefs, the initiative as to whether or not 
action would be fought the next day rested with 
Admiral Scheer. At 9:00 P.M. this, apparently, 
was not appreciated by the British high command. 
The German Commander-in-Chief's estimate and 
decisions for the night were: 

"It might safely be expected that in the twilighf 
the enemy would endeavor by attacking with strong 
forces, and during the night with destroyers, to 
force us over to the west in order to open battle with 
us when it was light. He was strong enough to do 
it. If we could succeed in warding off the enemy's 
encircling movement, and could be the first to reach 
Horn Reefs, then the liberty of decision for the 
next morning was assured to us. In order to make 
this possible all flotillas were ordered to be ready 
to attack at night, even though there was a danger 
when day broke of their not being able to take part 
in the new battle that was expected. The Main 
Fleet in close formation was to make for Horn 
Reefs by the shortest route, and, defying all enemy 
[146] 



THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE 

attacks, keep on that course. In accordance with 
this, preparations for the night were made. In 
view of the fact that the leading ships of the Main 
Fleet would chiefly have to ward off the attacks of 
the enemy, and in order that at daybreak there 
should be powerful vessels at the head. Squadron 
II [predreadnaughts] was placed in the rear. Out 
of consideration for their damaged condition, 
Scouting Division I [battle cruisers] was told off 
to cover the rear, Division II [light cruisers] to the 
vanguard, and the IVth [light cruisers] to cover 
the starboard side. The Leaders of the torpedo- 
boat forces placed the flotillas in an E.N.E. to 
S.S.W. direction,* which was where the enemy 
Main Fleet could be expected. A great many of 
the boats had fii'ed off all their torpedoes during 
the battle. Some were left behind for the protec- 
tion of the badly damaged Liltzow [speed reduced 
to 15 knots] ; others were retained by the flotilla 
leaders in case of emergency. 

"At 9:00 P.M. the head of the line stood at 
Lat. 56° 3r N., Long. 5° 30' E. At 9:06 the or- 
der for the night was 'Course S.S.E. ^4 E'> speed 
16 knots.' " 

Admiral S cheer held rigidly to his plan to reach 
the shelter of Horn Keef s by daylight. During the 
late afternoon, although it cannot be said that op- 

* This probably means in a sector E.N.E. to S.S.W. rather than 
in a line. 

[147] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

portunity was lacking, the British took no effective 
steps to frustrate it. If the British had wished to 
assure an action in the open sea the next morning, 
and at the same time wished to avoid night fight- 
ing, it would have been necessary to push the 
German fleet farther to the westward during the 
late afternoon. This was not done. Admiral Jel- 
licoe did not wish to fight during the night nor in 
the Horn Reefs Passage at early daylight. It is 
apparent, therefore, that Admiral Scheer, at 9:00 
P.M., held the initiative as to whether or not he 
would engage the following day. 

In this last phase of the day fighting it is re- 
corded that the light cruiser Calliope fired one 
torpedo. A summary of the torpedo attacks dur- 
ing the day action indicates that the destroyer work, 
on the whole, was disappointing. In the day action 
of the 31 destroyers with Beatty about 12 attacked 
at 4 :15 ; four destroyers with Hood attacked shortly 
before six ; of the 42 destroyers with Jellicoe none 
attacked enemy capital ships during daylight. On 
the German side about 11 of the 33 destroyers 
with Hipper attacked at 4:15; at 4:49 five more 
attacked; at 6:00 some 10 or 12 destroyers attacked 
Hood's ships; at 6:35 during the first veering 
around and withdrawal of the German line, three 
destroyers attacked (it was probably a torpedo 
from one of those that hit the Marlborough) ; at 
7:15, during the second withdrawal of the German 
fleet, 10 to 15 destroyers attacked under cover of 
[148] 



THE BATTLE: FOURTH PHASE 

gun-fire, fired torpedoes and made a smoke screen; 
and these were followed about fifteen minutes later 
by a second wave of about 20 destroyers which, 
however, were not afforded the cover of gun-fire — 
they were engaged and turned back by British 
heavy and light forces before they could attack the 
battleships. In addition light cruisers and de- 
stroyers on both sides did some detached fighting 
during which torpedoes were fired. 

Making a rough estimate, it is thus seen that 
during the day battle, out of about 77 destroyers 
on the British side, about 16 to 20 fired torpedoes 
at capital ships, while out of about 78 German 
destroyers about 35 to 40 fired torpedoes at British 
capital ships. Considering the fact that conditions 
were favorable for torpedo work, it does not ap- 
pear that, on the British side at least, a very effec- 
tive use was made of the destroyers as an offensive 
weapon. It may be added, as a point to empha- 
size, that the German plan for coordinating battle- 
ships, cruisers, and destroyers in a daylight action, 
as carried out during the third and fourth phases, 
presents one of the most important tactical con- 
siderations of the battle. 



[149] 



VIII 

THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE 

(9:00 P.M., 31 May to 3:00 A.M., 1 June) 

During the night Jellicoe withdraws to the south 
while Scheer steers for Horn Reefs. British Light 
Forces are intermittently engaged with the High 
Sea Fleet. (Diagram 24.) 

At 9:00 P.M. the British Battle Fleet was dis- 
posed in night cruising formation, course south, 
speed 17 knots, in four parallel squadron columns, 
one mile apart with light cruisers ahead and astern. 
From east to west the order of Squadrons was 
5th, 1st, 4th, and 2nd. Beatty's battle cruisers 
maintained a position about 14 miles on the star- 
board hand of the battleships. The flotillas were 
spread five miles astern to screen the fleet and also 
to be in favorable position to attack the enemy. 
(Diagram 25.) A mine layer was sent to lay a 
mine field in the Horn Beefs Passage, and during 
the night three British submarines were stationed 
in that vicinity, 4, 12, and 20 miles, respectively, 
west of Vyl lightship. 
[150] 



iRN^ /JCLLtCOD 




flOlOPM. IHO.LT. CRUISER SQUADRON ATTACKED 6C0UTrtl(i Ot** • nWOEmtBaOlll. 
50UTMA^.PTON iDU6UN OAMACU) BYGUHriRC. 

4T« ficmu* PUT g-ii OUT or«cnoK. 

f iTjoPM. *TKn.onaA attacko) rosido S> 
^VB"«i •RostocKTORi'EDOca - UBmo mcouiSCBWfnrPOSiai* 5(!HBMW>t«»»MIiiMCt>- 

^IZ'OOPM 4.TH FLOTILLA 8. fearless TIFtCMSTSUni 

^ATTAOttO INO aATTUE SOUAORON. 
rORTUNE iAJ^ENT 5UNK. 
^SLACX PRINCE SUNK.l^OOPM; 
^H:15 AM. 

r NASSAU CUT OOWNTURBiaEHt 



4;00M». 
•711 rujTltiA ATr*cra) StCONO 

BATTLE SauA0R0^4 h POMmCfM WXS I 




tJSATM 
M0RE3BV SiaKTCO 4 SKIPS. 
(SECOND QATTLC SaUABRON) 



•noi!N3 ECCP L.1 

■nippEaiX3:oo 




y fttuOenoid mines in 
defined area about is miles 



Diagram No. 24 

track of the heavy ships during the fifth phase 
(9:00 P.M. MAY 31sT TO 3:00 a. m. june 1st) 

During the night Jellicoe withdraws to the south while 
Scheer steers for Horn Reefs. British light forces are 
intermittently engaged with the High Sea Fleet 

ri5i] 



THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE 

Scheer's battle squadrons proceeded during the 
night in modified inverted order, speed 16 knots; 
the Westfalen led Squadron I in the van, then 
came Squadron III, then Squadron II (the pre- 
dreadnaughts), while the battle cruisers brought 
up the rear. The Germans carried out the decision 
— "The Main Fleet in close formation was to make 
for Horn Reefs by the shortest route, and, defying 
all enemy attacks, keep on that course." 

Throughout the short summer night of about 
five hours the British destroyers and cruisers, which 
were gradually drawn to the eastward, maintained 
intermittent contact with the enemy battle fleet. 
At different times by various destroyers all of the 
enemy battle squadrons were sighted before day- 
light. 

At 10:04 the western destroyers of the 11th 
Flotilla sighted and attacked enemy cruisers. At 
10:20 the 2nd light cruiser squadron engaged 
Scout Division IV. The German Frauenlob was 
torpedoed and sunk, while the British Sauthampton 
and Dublin suffered from gun-fire. At 11 :00 the 
4th Flotilla was engaged and the German S-32 
was put out of action by a hit in her boiler com- 
partment. 

At 11:30 the 4th Flotilla attacked the enemy 
cruisers Rostock and Elbing on the port side of 
the German Battle Squadron I. In withdrawing 
the cruisers passed through the battleship line. 
While doing this the Rostock was hit by a torpedo 

[153] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

and the Elhing collided with the Posen. Both the 
Elbing and Rostock were put out of action and 
later blown up. On the British side, in this attack, 
the Tipperary was disabled by gun-fire and later 
sank ; the Sparrowhawk rammed the Broke and the 
former was abandoned a few hours later; the Spit- 
fire also collided with an enemy cruiser. 

At 11:35 the Birmingham reported enemy battle 
cruisers steering south in Lat. 56° 46' N., 5° 46' 
E. At 12;00 the 4th Flotilla and Fearless at- 
tacked the German 2nd Battle Squadron. The 
Fortune and Ardent were sunk by gun-fire. Also, 
at midnight the Black Prince suddenly appeared 
within 1,500 meters of Squadron I. The Thilringen 
and Ostfriesland switched on searchlights and 
opened fire. In a few seconds the Black Prince 
was on fire and four minutes later sank with a 
terrific explosion. 

At 12:15 the German battleship Nassau turned 
out of column to evade a torpedo attack and cut 
through the British destroyer Turbulent which in- 
stantly sank. The Nassau also damaged the de- 
stroyer Petard by gun-fire. These destroyers were 
of the 13th Flotilla which had become scattered. 
The Nassau did not rejoin that night but met the 
High Sea Fleet at the Horn Reefs rendezvous next 
morning. 

The damaged Liitzow, accompanied by destroy- 
ers, was falling astern and shortly before 2:00 
A.M. she had 7,000 tons of water forward which 
[154] 



llrti. 4th. IZtti. 9tti. 10th Bttt. 

TV V V V V V 
Destroyers 

6aHe3 



j Cruiser SquQdtXJW 



I 

i 



jcaicoc 



1st 



IZnd UCruiselr 
Squadnsn 



Bsth. 



'I4inites 



|4tti Lt Cruiser 
I &qyadron. 



CAOTf 



Diagram No. 25 

british night cruising formation signalled shortly 
after 9:00 p.m. 31 may 

[155] 



THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE 

caused her propellers to fan the air. Thereupon 
she was abandoned and torpedoed. The crew, 
totaling 1,250, including wounded, were taken off 
by four destroyers. 

At 2:00 the 12th Flotilla, having been drawn 
some miles to the northeast, made contact with 
the German Battle Squadron II and attacked. 
The Pommern was torpedoed and sank with all 
hands. The signal reporting the location of the 
Squadron was not received by Jellicoe or any ship, 
presumably because of the strong interference 
caused by the German wireless.* 

At 2:30 the MarlborougU reported she could 
make only 12 knots. Vice Admiral Sir Cecil 
Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge, and the 
Marlborough, under escort of Fearless, proceeded 
to port. This caused the 6th British battleship 
Division to stray, and it was not until the next 
evening that this Division with the Vice Admiral 
rejoined the fleet. 

At 2 :35 the destroyer Moresby sighted four Ger- 
man battleships of the Deutschland class and fired 
one torpedo. This was the last shot in the night 
fighting. At 2:40 dawn was breaking. 

Although the British destroyers which made 

* The loss of this message sent by the destroyer Faulknor has been 
featured in the press as a stroke of good fortune for the Germans 
which presented the British Fleet from intercepting the High Sea 
Fleet at daylight. This is misleading. As Admiral JeUicoe did not 
wish to risk either a night action, or an early morning action in the 
vicinity of the mine fields oflF Horn Reefs, it is evident that the 
battle would not have been renewed at daylight even if the Faulk- 
nor's message had been received by the British Commander-in-Chief. 

[157] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

contact with the enemy pushed home spirited at- 
tacks, it would appear that the general purpose of 
the night British dispositions was to use the de- 
stroyers for defense rather than offense. The 
British destroyers were assigned to take station five 
miles astern of the battle fleet as a defensive screen. 
There might have been no attacks had not the 
course of the German High Sea Fleet cut through 
the screen. This caused the night fighting which 
has been recounted. It was generally of a hap- 
hazard nature and did no damage to enemy capital 
ships with the exception of the attack of the 12th 
Flotilla on the 2nd Battle Squadron just before 
dawn. This latter attack was well planned and 
efficiently executed. It resulted in the destruction 
of the predreadnaught Pommern. 

Admiral Scheer states that destroyers of five 
flotillas proceeded to the attack during the night, 
that they had various nocturnal fights with enemy 
light forces, but that they did not sight the British 
Main Fleet. He also states that a great many of 
the destroyers had expended their torpedoes dur- 
ing the day action. The cover of night presents 
opportunity for destroyer attack, and the night 
immediately following a day action is generally 
regarded as a favorable time to launch an effective 
destroyer offensive. It would appear, however, 
that the German destroyers did not search out the 
British Fleet, but kept comparatively close to their 
own ships. All the attacking flotillas except one 
[158] 



BEATIY 




Niigo 



.noENtttrsLS 







-=53>, 



•\l)J LijW Ship 



In dtnnti) orio 
oboiit 16 mi\e5 ftDOl 
Vljl Light Ship 

OstfrleslancJ hit 




mint 



10 IS zs a 
■ i . • ■ '■ ■ ' ■ I ■ ii i iii T m il r f 



Diagram No. 26 

maneuvers on june ist after the battle 



[159] 



THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE 

joined the Main Fleet at daybreak. The missing 
flotilla had been pressed by the British light forces 
to the north and made its escape the next day via 
Skagen. 

At dawn Jellicoe was far to the southwest of 
the Horn Reefs course. Instead of closing the 
Horn Reefs as had been his intention the night 
before, he decided to sweep to the north and 
gather together his scattered forces. In order to 
be ready for battle should the German Fleet attack, 
at 2 :47 the Battle Fleet formed single line on course 
north. Visibility was now a little over 3 miles, 
weather fine, wind of force 3 from S.S.W., sea 
smooth. At 2:52 Jellicoe had 20 battleships in line 
accompanied by one destroyer and three cruisers. 

Admiral Jellicoe has explained his early morn- 
ing estimate and decision: 

"... Partly on account of the low visibility, 
and partly because of the inevitable difference in 
dead reckoning between ships, due to their many 
movements in course of the action and in the night, 
considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting 
the Fleet. This applied particularly to the de- 
stroyer flotillas, as they had been heavily engaged, 
and their facilities for computing their positions 
under these conditions were only slight; but the 
same difficulty was experienced with all classes of 
ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause 
me any surprise. 

[161] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

"The difficulties experienced in collecting the 
Fleet (particularly the destroyers), due to the 
above causes, rendered it undesirable for the Battle 
Fleet to close the Horn Reefs at daylight, as had 
been my intention when deciding to steer to the 
southward during the night. It was obviously nec- 
essary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and the de- 
stroyers before renewing action. By the time this 
concentration was effected it had become apparent 
that the High Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn 
Reefs, had passed behind the shelter of the German 
mine fields in the early morning on the way to 
their ports. The information obtained from our 
wireless directional stations during the early morn- 
ing showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet must 
have passed the Horn Reefs on a southerly course 
shortly after daylight." 

During the night five German airships were sent 
out to make an early reconnaissance. At 3:10 
twelve battleships were reported to the westward 
of Horn Reefs on a north course, and a little later 
more battleships and battle cruisers to the north 
of those first reported. Also numerous light forces 
were reported. At 3:00 A.M. another airship re- 
ported a unit of 12 ships in Jammers Bay steam- 
ing rapidly to the south. 

Soon after daylight Admiral Scheer had with 
him: sixteen dreadnaught battleships — ^the Koenig 
division of the four newest dreadnaughts had ex- 
[162] 



THE BATTLE: FIFTH PHASE 

pended most of their ammunition and three of them 
had sustained damage. The other twelve ships 
were practically undamaged; five predreadnaught 
battleships, practically undamaged; three light 
cruisers, slightly damaged; sixty destroyers (ap- 
proximate), many with all torpedoes expended. 

On arriving at Horn Reefs at about 3 :00 A.M., 
Admiral S cheer decided to wait for the LiltzoWj 
but a little later, having been informed of her fate, 
he made the following estimate and decision: 

"In our opinion the ships in a southwesterly 
direction as reported by L-11 could only just 
have come from the Channel to try, on hearing the 
news of the battle, to join up with their Main Fleet 
and advance against us.* There was no occa- 
sion for us to shun an encounter with this group, 
but owing to the slight chance of meeting on ac- 
count of visibility conditions, it would have been 
a mistake to have followed them. Added to this 
the reports received from the battle cruisers showed 
that Scouting Division I would not be capable of 
sustaining a serious fight, besides which the leading 
ships of Squadron III could not have fought for 

* It does not appear that the British force of 8 predreadnaughts 
and four cruisers in the Humber, put to sea at all. The Harwich 
force of light cruisers and destroyers (about 30) were held in port 
by Admiralty orders until the morning of June 1st. They were then 
sent to reenforce Jellicoe but were too late to be a factor and were 
turned back before joining. Four of these destroyers were used to 
escort the injured Marlborough to port. Admiral Jellicoe has stated 
that this Harwich force would have been a welcome reenforcement 
during the night and at dawn. 

[163] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

any length of time, owing to the reduction in their 
supply of munitions by the long spell of firing. 
The Frankfurt, Pillau and Regenshurg were the 
only fast light cruisers now available and in such 
misty weather there was no depending on aerial 
reconnaissance. There was, therefore, no certain 
prospect of defeating the enemy reported in the 
south. An encounter and the consequences thereof 
had to be left to chance. I therefore abandoned 
the idea of further operations and ordered the 
return to port." 

As has been said, the arrival of the High Sea 
Fleet off Horn Reefs gave S cheer the initiative in 
regard to the renewal of the battle. His decision 
to return to port may be considered the final act 
of the engagement. 

En route to the German bases the Ostfriesland 
hit a mine but sufi'ered no great damage. A Ger- 
man destroyer also hit a mine and sank with all 
hands. Admiral Scheer reported that submarines 
were encountered, and their attacks frustrated. 
(Diagram 26.) 

Considerable difficulty was experienced in re- 
assembling the British Grand Fleet. At 3 :33 the 
5th Battle Squadron rejoined, but the 6th Divi- 
sion of three battleships did not join up until eve- 
ning. The cruisers were not sighted until 6:00 
A.M., and the destroyers did not join up until 
9 :00 A.M. The Grand Fleet, after sweeping the 
battlefield, proceeded to its bases. 
[164] 



IX 

CONCLUSION 

Such, in brief, were the tactics of the Battle of 
Jutland. The action was indecisive. Therefore, 
it had no decisive influence upon the naval situa- 
tion or the general course of the war. The battle 
is unique in that it was the only major fleet en- 
gagement in the World War, and, considering the 
size, power, and scientific development of the ships 
and weapons used, together with the magnitude of 
the issue which hung in the balance, ranks with the 
greatest battles in history. This truth is not gen- 
erally appreciated because the battle was not 
fought to the decisive conclusion which would have 
clearly demonstrated it. 

Before attempting a judgment of the tactical 
plans and doctrines used respectively by the Brit- 
ish and Germans at Jutland it would be necessary 
to take into consideration the larger questions of 
policy governing the conduct of the war. The 
ramifications of policy and strategy which may or 
may not have justified Admiral Jellicoe's plan and 
doctrine of a "cautious offensive," and Admiral 
Scheer's plan and doctrine of an "offensive-de- 

[165] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

fensive," are not within the scope of this discussion. 
It is enough for the present to point out these 
respective plans and doctrines with their conse- 
quences — in short, to explain what happened at 
Jutland. The importance to the United States of 
reading aright the lessons of this engagement is 
obvious. 

From the German viewpoint the battle was a 
success, and it cannot be denied that the official 
announcement of a German victory in a great fleet 
action had an important moral effect. The British 
Admiralty announcement of heavy losses was ac- 
cepted as confirmation of the German claim to 
victory. The popular demand for greater fleet 
activity had received a satisfactory answer, and the 
people of Germany were filled with pride for their 
Navy. This strengthened the hands of the Govern- 
ment at a critical period in the war. 

As a matter of fact, as has been said, the battle 
was indecisive and had no marked effect on the 
naval and military situation. The British Navy 
still controlled the High Seas, while the German 
Navy continued its dominance of the Baltic and 
home coastal waters. Great Britain still enjoyed 
the benefits of open sea communications leading to 
all parts of the world, while German sea com- 
munications were confined to a restricted area em- 
bracing only the North European neutrals. 

On the other hand, the contention made after 
the battle by Mr. Balfour, then First Lord of the 
[166] 



CONCLUSION 

British Admiralty, a contention maintained by high 
British authority to this day, that England already 
enjoyed all the benefits which could have been de- 
rived from a Jutland victory, is misleading. On 
the contrary it would appear that the destruction 
of the High Sea Fleet at Jutland would have pro- 
duced a change of far-reaching significance in the 
war situation. Mine fields not protected by guns 
may be swept up. With the German battle fleet 
eliminated the German mine fields out of range 
of guns ashore could have been swept up, while 
British mine fields could have been maintained 
comparatively close up to the German harbors. 
Submarines would have continued to give trouble, 
but the removal of their mobile heavy gun support 
would have greatly reduced their ejffectiveness. 
For the most part they would have been kept busy 
guarding the German coast line. It is also to be 
remembered that as the war advanced anti-subma- 
rine measures attained greater efficiency. Another 
consequence of a decisive British victory at Jutland 
would have been to open Allied sea communications 
to Russia's Baltic ports. With Russia thus saved 
to the Allied cause and the German Baltic coast 
threatened with invasion, Germany would have 
been subjected to severe additional pressure. 
Moreover, the removal of the menacing German 
"fleet in being" would have released great numbers 
of workers engaged in Enghsh naval industries 
and permitted the transfer of considerable energy 

[167] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

to army activities. And finally the unrestricted 
German submarine campaign against commerce 
would have been greatly hampered if not completely 
frustrated had the British fleet destroyed the Ger- 
man fleet at Jutland. It was the High Sea Battle 
Fleet that not only held the gates for the U-boats, 
but also, to a large extent, supplied the skilled 
personnel to man them. On the whole, it would 
not appear an exaggeration to say that a second 
Trafalgar on the day of Jutland would have 
crushed Germany's hope and brought Allied vic- 
tory into view. 

The tactics of two fleets in battle may be com- 
pared to the tactics employed by two chess players 
in moving their pieces on the game board. The 
ships have various values and abilities just as the 
chessmen have various values and abilities. But 
the tactics of maneuvering ships in battle pre- 
sent much more complex and baffling problems 
than the tactics of the chess game. In the latter 
the relative value of the pieces are invariable and 
the rules for moving are fixed; skill can be devel- 
oped by long years of practice under conditions 
which never change. On the other hand, in naval 
tactics, numerous variables enter and interact on 
each other to produce a multiplicity and complicity 
of combinations. On the day of battle, as at Jut- 
land, the two commanders may face each other 
without previous experience in actual war. Under 
such circumstances it would indeed be astonishing 
[168] 



CONCLUSION 

if tactical mistakes were not made. Skill, how- 
ever, is relative, and the high command better 
equipped by study, peace time maneuvers, war col- 
lege training, and experience afloat, possesses an 
advantage, which, if the forces are otherwise near 
a parity, will inevitably decide the victory. 

To naval administrators and professional men, 
the Jutland battle presents a study of absorbing 
interest. For the first and only time, modern types 
of ships and weapons were placed on trial. As a 
result, it cannot be said that there were very start- 
ling surprises. The heavy gunned line of battle- 
ships with their ability to give and receive the 
hardest blows again demonstrated their supreme 
function in the struggle for control of the Seas. 
The battle cruisers showed their value as scouts 
and also their limitations — as now developed — when 
called upon to take station in the line of battle. The 
need for light cruisers in a balanced fleet was em- 
phasized. The varied usefulness of destroyers both 
for offense and defense was clearly shown at Jut- 
land and has assured this type the recognition it 
deserves. Although aircraft and submarines took 
part in the operations they had no influence in the 
actual fighting of the battle. That this will not 
be a condition in future naval battles is a question 
hardly open to argument. Aircraft and submarines 
will undoubtedly come into their own and take their 
proper place as important tactical factors. But it 
remains a fact that they were practically negligible 

[169] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

at Jutland. This consideration provides a valuable 
check to extravagant claims made for these com- 
paratively new elements in naval warfare. 

Reviewing the tactical features of the action, it 
is seen that, both by commission and omission, the 
principles taught by the experiences of history 
are strikingly portrayed under the new light af- 
forded by the use of modern ships and modern 
weapons. In the course of the analysis of the 
action it has been attempted to point by illustra- 
tion these principles of offense and defense, con- 
centration, coordination, information, surprise, 
initiative, plan, indoctrination, and cooperative 
skill. The conclusion is clear enough, that no 
matter how great the preponderance of material 
power, the navy that neglects these principles will 
be found wanting when tried by the test of battle. 



[170] 



APPENDIX 

LOSSES AND DAMAGE 

The losses are summarized in the following table :* 

British 

THREE BATTLE CRUISEES 

Tonnage 

Queen Mary 26,350 

Indefatigable 18,800 

Invincible 17^50 

THREE ARMORED CRUISERS 

Defmse 14,600 

Warrior 13,550 

Black Prince 13,350 

EIGHT DESTROYERS 

Tipperary 1,430 

Nestor 890 

Nomad 890 

Turbulent 1,100 

Fortune 965 

Ardent 935 

Shark 935 

Sparrowhawk 935 

Total 111,980 

* The High Sea Fleet at Jutland, by Lieutenant Commander H. H. 
Frost, U. S. N., Naioal Ijistitute Pro<;eedings. 

[171] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

Germans 

ONE BATTLE CEUISER 

Tonnage 

Lutzow 26,180 

ONE PEE-DREADNAU6HT 

Pommem 13,200 

FOUR LIGHT CRUISERS 

Wiesbaden 5,400 

Elbmg 4,500 

Rostock 4,900 

Frauenloh 2,700 

FIVE DESTROYERS 

V-4. 570 

V-48 750 

V-27 640 

V-29 640 

S-35 700 

Total 60,180 

PERSONNEL KILLED AND WOUNDED 

British: Killed or missing 6,447 

Wounded 564 

Total 7,011 

German : Killed or missing 2,400 

Wounded 400 

Total 2,800 

(British figures quoted from Commander Bellairs; Ger- 
man figures from Admiral Scheer.) 
[172] 



APPENDIX 

The ship damage is indicated in the following 

table : 

British Ships Damaged and Put Out of Action 
Dreadnaught Battleships 

Warspite Hit by major caliber shells be- 
tween 20 and 25 times. Re- 
joined fleet during July. 

Marlborough Torpedoed. Continued in day 

action but was forced to fall 
out during night. 

British Ships Damaged But Not Put Out of Action 
Battle Cruisers 

Lion .Hit many times. One turret 

put out of action. 
Tiger Hit a considerable number of 

times. 
Princesg Rot/ed Hit a considerable number of 

times. One turret put out of 

action. 

New Zealand Hit several times. 

Dreadnaught Battleships 

Barham Hit by about five heavy shells. 

Malaya Hit by about eight heavy shells. 

Colossus Hit by one heavy shell. 

Light Cruisers 

Calliope Hit by one heavy shell and by 

several lighter shells. 
DvbUn Hit many times by small caliber 

shells. 
Southampton Hit many times by small caliber 

shells (89 casualties). 
Chester .Hit many times and severely 

damaged (81 casualties). 

Rejoined fleet on July 29. 

[173] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

German Vessels Considerably Damaged 

(Number of Hits Approximate Only) 
Battle Cruisers (4) 

Derfflmger 25 hits 

Seydlitz 25 hits ; 1 torpedo hit 

Moltke 5 hits 

Von der Tann. ., 4 hits 

Battleships (4) 

Koenig , . . 7 hits 

Grosser Kurfurst .... 7 hits 

Marhgraf 13 hits 

Ostfrieslamd 1 mine 

Destroyers (2) 

G-40 Engines damaged 

S-32 Boilers damaged 

German Vessels Moderately Damaged 

Dreadnaught Battleships (2) 

Heligoland 1 hit 

Kaiser 1 hit 

Predreadnaught Battleship (1) 
Holstein 1 hit 

Light Cruisers (5) 

Frankfurt 4 small caliber hits 

PUlau J. 1 large caliber hit 

Stettin 2 small caliber hits 

Mv/nchen 6 small caliber hits 

Uainburg 4 small caliber hits 

In addition several ships were hit by small caliber shells 
fired by British destroyers during the night action and a 
few destroyers were hit and slightly damaged. 
[174] 



APPENDIX 

DESIGN OF WAR SHIPS AS AFFECTED BY 
JUTLAND 

The following excerpts are taken from a paper by Rear 
Admiral D. W. Taylor, Chief Constructor, U. S. Navy 
(The Franklin Institute) : 

The losses and heavy damages sustained by the vessels 
of battle cruiser type bear out to some extent the pre-war 
contentions of those who maintained that it was not fit to 
take its place in the line of battle. On the other hand, 
excepting their greater vulnerability, it cannot be denied 
that they acquitted themselves with credit even when pitted 
against the more heavily armed and armored battleship. 

Another result from this action of general influence on 
type is found in connection with the use of older battle- 
ships, generally referred to as of the "predreadnaught" 
era. The German Fleet included one squadron of vessels 
of this type, and this squadron not only failed to be of any 
essential assistance to them but proved actually to be a 
handicap on their freedom of maneuver. The force of this 
lesson was shown by the fact that subsequent to the battle 
most of the German battleships of this type were retired 
from active commission. The material weakness of this 
type of older ships, when opposed to the most modem 
weapons, was shown in the case of the Pommern, which 
blew up and sank immediately as a result of a single 
torpedo. During the war there were sunk by hostile ac- 
tion 21 predreadnaught battleships and 27 armored 
cruisers; of this total of 48, 11 were sunk by gun-fire and 
37 by mine or torpedo, only a single explosion in nearly 
every case being necessary to inflict the fatal damage. 

The ability of the large, modern, heavily-armored ships 
not only to survive, but to continue in action after the 
most severe punishment, was perhaps best shown by the 
British battleship Warspite, which, due to an unfortunate 

[175] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

accident to the steering gear, sheered out of the battle 
line and made two complete circles within short range of 
the German Fleet. This vessel was hit by major caliber 
shell between 20 and 25 times. The net result of this tre- 
mendous hammering was that one out of eight 15-inch 
guns was put out of action ; there was no damage of any 
kind to her main machinery plant ; the upper works and 
unprotected portions of the ship were riddled ; communica- 
tions were interrupted to a considerable extent ; and some 
compartments at and below the waterline were flooded 
by water which came in from above, but none of the main 
compartments were affected to such an extent that the 
entering water could not be handled by the pumping ar- 
rangements provided. In short, although the ship had lost 
a certain amount of her margin of safety, due to decreased 
buoyancy and stability, and her speed had suffered on ac- 
count of increased resistance due to her greater draft, she 
was entirely capable of resuming action after adjustments 
to her steering gear. 

The Marlborough was another example of a battleship 
continuing in action after receiving what we were inclined 
formerly to consider would be a disabling attack. This 
vessel, although of the "dreadnaught" era, has not what 
is now considered a highly efficient form of protection 
against torpedo attack, yet, after being struck by a tor- 
pedo, resulting in the flooding of a number of compart- 
ments, which produced a list of about 7 degrees, the vessel 
continued in action at a speed of 17 knots. 

Similarly, the German battleship Ostfriesland (of the 
"dreadnaught" era) was struck by a torpedo which pro- 
duced some flooding, but the vessel was otherwise unaf- 
fected and continued on with the German Fleet. 

No other British battleships received any considerable 
amount of punishment, but three of the modem German 
ships of this class received, respectively, 7, 7 and 13 hits 
[176] 



APPENDIX 

from major caliber guns, but none of them were disabled 
or even damaged to an extent sufficient to prevent their 
continuing in action. The Markgraf, which was struck 1& 
times, is a particularly illuminating example of the amount 
of punishment which a modem heavily armored sliip can 
stand. The only damage affecting the efficiency of the 
ship was the cutting of the communications from the 
masthead fire control positions, and this only resulted in 
shifting the control to the lower armored station pro- 
vided for this purpose. The casualties on this ship were 
likewise remarkably low, as there were only 8 dead and 9 
wounded, or only a little more than one casualty for 
each major caliber hit. 

One particular class of hit of special interest to Ameri- 
can designers is that in which turrets or their barbettes 
have been hit. Taking the case of four British and four 
German vessels which suffered heavy damage, it is found 
that out of a total of about 116 hits, 19, or 16.5 per cent, 
were on turrets or barbettes, of which 16 were struck. 
Of this number, four were completely put out of action 
and one gun in each of four others was disabled, while the 
remaining eight escaped without serious damage. In other 
words, out of 66 big guns carried by these ships, the em- 
placements of 32 were struck, but only 12 were sufficiently 
damaged to prevent their further use. This comparatively 
low proportion of casualty in the major offensive arma- 
ment, together with the demonstration of the ability of 
the mechanism of a turret to continue to function even 
after the turret has had a direct hit, appears to dispose 
of the argument of "too many eggs in one basket" so fre- 
quently advanced against the American three-gun turret. 

Turning to the damage sustained by the battle cruisers, 
one's attention is naturally taken first by the tragic loss 
of the three great British vessels of this type. Although 
in one case the Germans claimed a torpedo hit on one of 

[177] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

them, it is generally accepted that the loss of all three was 
directly attributable to gun-fire, but the immediate cause 
of the loss in each case is still, and always will be, shrouded 
in mystery. It is, of course, known that each one sank in 
an appallingly short interval of time and that in each case 
at least a portion of the magazines blew up. The mystery 
lies in the immediate cause of the magazine explosion. 
Many different explanations have been advanced, but all 
of these affect details rather than the general character- 
istics of type. There seems little doubt that one of two 
things happened : German shell either entered the magazine 
through penetration of the protective deck, or, having 
pierced turret or barbette and exploded, flame was com- 
municated to the magazine along the path followed by the 
ammunition from magazine to gun. From the fact that in 
the case of British ships that survived, there was only one 
case of penetration below the protective deck at any part 
(no harm resulted from this), it would seem to be highly 
improbable that the three battle cruisers were all sunk by 
protective deck penetrations directly over the magazines, 
and not very probable that any one of them was so sunk. 
We must not permit our judgment to be swayed too 
largely by this particularly spectacular phase of the 
battle. Just as in the case of the battleships previously 
referred to, the remaining battle cruisers on both sides 
demonstrated ability of modem ships of large size to with- 
stand heavy punishment without losing their fighting effi- 
ciency. The battle cruiser type is essentially and unavoid- 
ably less thoroughly protected than the battleship type. 
This greater vulnerability must result in greater loss of 
the battle cruiser type, other things being equal; but in 
the Jutland fight the battle cruisers were engaged much 
longer and much more severely than the battleships, so 
that a greater percentage of loss of this type should have 
[178] 



APPENDIX 

resulted even had their protection been equal to that of 
the battleships. 

A notable fact in regard to the modem ships, both bat- 
tleships and battle cruisers, on both sides, is that not a 
single one experienced a disabling casualty to its machin- 
ery, either as a result of damage from enemy fire or as a 
result of engineering breakdown. In the case of one Brit- 
ish ship and one German ship, fires were drawn from under 
the boilers in one fireroom, due in each case to leakage 
from adjacent compartments, but in each case this leakage 
was controlled by the pumping plant provided for the 
purpose. Leaving out the three lost battle cruisers, for 
which no data are available, the dozen large ships in the 
two fleets which bore the brunt of the punishment were hit 
a total of about 150 times by large caliber shell, or an av- 
erage of more than 12 times each. Only one of these dozen 
ships, namely, the German battle cruiser Liitzow, sank 
as the result of the damage received. Even this vessel 
sank only after six hours. She had received 17 large 
caliber hits and one torpedo. She continued to try to 
make the best of her way to port, but the struggle was 
given up about one o'clock in the morning; her crew was 
taken off by destroyers and she was finally sunk by a 
friendly torpedo. 

The results of the battle, as a test of the defensive 
qualities of capital ships, show that in the entire action 
only four modern armored ships, all of them of the battle 
cruiser type, were lost as a result of the action. This was 
out of a total of 14 engaged and at least seven out of the 
remaining 10 survived heavier punishment than most de- 
signers in pre-war days would have considered possible. 

Before the war there were two distinct schools of naval 
thought in regard to the main armament for the largest 
fighting ships. This difference of opinion existed inter- 
nally in probably every navy, but internationally the 

[179] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

American and Britisli navies represented the "Big Gun" 
advocates, as is shown by the fact that in the former we 
find successive increases from 12-inch to 14-inch to 
16-inch, and in the latter from 12-inch to 131/^-inch to 
15-inch. On the other hand, the Germans adhered for a 
number of years to the 11-inch gun and increased their 
caliber to 12-inch with apparent reluctance, and a larger 
caliber did not appear until close to the end of the war. 
There were undoubtedly excellent theoretical arguments 
on both sides of this contention. Even now the argument 
cannot be definitely settled in terms of absolute material 
results, for too many other factors, which cannot be elim- 
inated, enter into the problem. A convincing answer, how- 
ever, appears to be provided in the very decided trend of 
German naval opinion since the Battle of Jutland. Prac- 
tically every report from German sources and every Ger- 
man publication bearing on the Battle of Jutland lays 
stress on the superiority in range and accuracy of the 
British 15-inch guns. Even if no definite material advan- 
tage for the larger caliber gun could be established, there 
appears to remain a marked moral superiority on the side 
possessing the biggest guns. This, of course, only con- 
firms the previous views and policies followed in our 
service. 

Summing up, therefore, we find that four outstanding 
facts of interest to the designer appear to emerge from 
the smoke and flames of the battle : 

First. The value of armor protection. 

Second. As a corollary to this, the necessity for the 
maximum number of maj or caliber guns ; for, if the mod- 
em ship can withstand great punishment, we must, for 
purposes of offense, provide a sufficient number of guns 
to inflict a degree of punishment which will be fatal. 

Third. The tactical value of speed. 
[180] 



APPENDIX 

Fourth. The futility of subjecting older ships to the 
attack of modern weapons. 

In other words, the value of each one of the three major 
elements entering into capital ship design was demon- 
strated and it cannot be said that any single one has 
emerged with an importance transcending that of the 
others. If, however, one must choose among them, the 
consensus of opinion will probably attach more impor- 
tance to protection than before the battle. This arises 
largely from two causes: 

1st. The deep impression on the human mind by suchi 
an outstanding tragedy as the almost instantaneous loss 
of the three great British battle cruisers. 

2d. The impression that German ships, generally 
speaking, stood punishment better than the English. Ad- 
miral von Tirpitz has been reported to have laid down as 
the fundamental principle of German design: That ves- 
sels before everything else must float ; that they must not 
sink, and if possible, not even list, and that all else is of 
Secondary importance. 

This emphasis on the feature of protection is shown 
already by the intensified and successful efforts of both 
the British and the American navies to perfect an efficient 
form of torpedo protection. In this connection, I think I 
can safely say that both services have solved this problem 
so far as the torpedo has been developed to date. It is 
also interesting to know that during the war the two 
services frankly and fully compared their solutions of this 
problem, and that although the solutions differ radically 
in details, they do not differ much in underlying ideas and' 
both are believed to be successful in result. This emphasis 
of the protective feature is further shown by the fact that 
our battle cruisers, whose construction was delayed, due 
to the necessity for our concentrating on the construction 
of torpedo craft and merchant vessels during the war, 

[181] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

have been re-designed and given much heavier and more 
complete protection than was originally contemplated, ac- 
cepting at the same time the slight decrease in speed neces- 
sitated thereby. We find precisely the same influence in 
the case of the latest British battle cruiser, the Hood, 
which was laid down shortly after the battle of Jutland 
and in which we find more than a 50 per cent increase in 
size as compared to the Renown, which I have previously 
referred to, an increase of protection almost to a battle- 
ship standard and a decrease in speed. 

Passing to the general phases of the war, we come at 
once to the outstanding feature of the war at sea, the 
submarine campaign and the methods adopted to combat 
it. Now that the veil of secrecy has been lifted, we all 
know how close the German submarine campaign came to 
being an outstanding factor in the final result. Without 
entering into the legality and ethics of the German use 
of the submarine against merchant shipping, which all 
thoughtful and enlightened men join in condemning, we 
cannot escape the fact that we must in the future be pre- 
pared to find the submarine playing an important part 
in attacking and throttling enemy commerce, even on 
their own coasts. The use of submarines during the war 
has led to placing very great emphasis on the value of 
radius of action of these vessels, and with radius of action 
there must go hand in hand improvements in the living 
conditions on board, so that the physical endurance of 
the personnel may be sufficiently conserved to permit it 
to make full use of the material capabilities of the vessel. 
Both of these elements, even without the usual and con- 
current demands, for higher speed and greater off^ensive 
power, inevitably lead to increased size, except for a 
limited class of small boats, which, due to a particular 
strategic situation, such as that occupied by the Germans 
on the Belgian Coast, makes it possible to use with good 
[182] 



APPENDIX 

results a large number of submarines of small size and 
limited speed and cruising radius. The technic of mine- 
laying has, during the war, so kept pace with the 
strategical and tactical demands for the use of this 
weapon, that the demonstrated practicability of laying 
them on the enemy's coast by means of submarines must 
in the future be taken into account, but this does not 
affect the general characteristics of the type, as the mine- 
laying feature can easily be substituted in whole or in 
part for the torpedo armament. Although the submarine 
was throughout the war something of a disappointment 
in the actual results which it obtained in inflicting loss 
or damage on the fighting ships of the enemy, its indirect 
effect on the freedom of the action of the main fighting 
fleets was so considerable that the problem of the develop- 
ment of the so-called fleet submarine is still with us and 
must be solved largely from theoretical and engineering 
considerations, rather than from direct experience in ac- 
tion. Another use of the submarine, not largely foreseen, 
which developed considerable importance during the war, 
is that of scouting. It has been conclusively demon- 
strated that these underwater craft form one of the most 
valuable assets to a navy in obtaining and transmitting 
information in regard to the movements of the enemy's 
forces. 

War experience developed and emphasized certain facts 
regarding submarines as a type wliich are very important 
from the point of view of a designer, and even more im- 
portant from the point of view of those who have to de- 
termine the constitution of a navy. The submarine is 
essentially an instrument of stealth. Once detected, it 
must take refuge in the depths where, for any design as 
yet known, its offensive powers become nil, and to the 
depth charge or explosive bomb developed during the war 
it is exceedingly vulnerable. In other words, once de- 

[183] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

tected and accurately located, a submarine is at the mercy 
of a surface vessel. While detection devices, in spite of 
the enormous effort expended upon them during the war, 
did not reach perfection, they made much progress and 
will undoubtedly be steadily improved as time goes on. 
If we had to-day an accurate device which would locate 
a submerged submarine with reasonable approximation 
several miles off, and with accuracy when one or two 
hundred feet directly under the surface vessel, the sub- 
marine would be already obsolete as a weapon of war. 
While we may never reach this ideal, and while the sub- 
marine may be given offensive features to enable it to 
deal in some fashion with the surface vessel from beneath 
the surface, the submarine is essentially a vulnerable, and, 
if I may so express it, a precarious type ; is necessary to- 
day and probably will be for many years to come, but 
could not be relied upon as the main feature of a navy. 
We read at times of proposed submersible battleships and 
other such imaginations, but the experience of the war 
does not seem to indicate this as a probable future de- 
velopment even if mechanically possible. 

On this same subject Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt, the Di- 
rector of Naval Construction for the British Admiralty, 
very recently stated liis views in the course of a paper 
presented before the British Institution of Naval Archi- 
tects. He said: 

*'A good deal has been written and talked of lately 
about the surface capital ship being dead and the neces- 
sity for submersibles. But with our present knowledge it 
would be quite impossible to design a submersible ship 
which on the same displacement and cost had anything 
like the fighting qualities on the surface, which are pos- 
sessed by the Hood (the latest British battle cruiser). 
Every ship is a compromise, and if in addition to the 
ordinary qualities of a battleship, she is required to sub- 
[184] 



APPENDIX 

merge, or even partially submerge, a very considerable 
percentage of weight has to be added to give her this ad- 
ditional capability of submergence. She becomes stiU 
more of a compromise, and the added weight must detract 
from the fighting qualities of the ship when on the sur- 
face, so that whatever is done, other things being equal, 
the submersible ship must be inferior to a surface ship 
in an ordinary action. There are many difficulties of 
details in the design of a submersible battleship which 
would take too long to go into fully now, and although 
there is no doubt that submarines are capable of great 
development, a little thought will make it clear to any- 
body that if naval warfare is to continue, the surface 
ship of the line must still hold the field as the principal 
fighting unit of any great navy." 

The actual offensive use of aircraft against naval ves- 
sels was little developed during the war. Perhaps the 
most prominent case was that of the Goehen, which was 
ashore near the Dardanelles, and for six days exposed 
to aircraft attack, it being stated that some 217 bombs 
were dropped against her. There is no doubt that there 
will be a great development of aircraft for naval use as 
a result of the war experience, and some enthusiasts have 
visions of navies of the air rendering obsolete the navies 
of the ocean. 

The United States Navy, which has in its own hands 
the development and control of its aircraft for use over 
the water, should take lead in any air naval development ; 
but there is no doubt that, step by step with the air of- 
fensive, there will be developed a defensive. The defensive, 
moreover, will not be passive. We have seen in the late 
war how the light craft, destroyers, etc., on one side met 
and countered the attacks of similar craft on the other 
side. Had either side been deprived of its light craft, it 
would have been at most serious disadvantage. Similarly, 

[185] 



WHAT HAPPENED AT JUTLAND 

developments in the air will undoubtedly be along the 
line of defending the capital ship by auxiliary and of- 
fensive aircraft. The big ship which must be protected 
from projectiles of a ton weight falling at angles of 30 
degrees, fired from ships almost out of sight below the 
horizon, is not yet in serious danger from bombs carried 
by present-day aircraft, with chances of hitting small 
indeed. 

At the moment it appears that the torpedo plane is the 
most promising development; its weapon of attack is the 
torpedo which the capital ship must already be prepared 
to defend itself from, whether fired by a surface vessel or 
a submarine. A torpedo from a ship in the air is no more 
deadly than from a submarine under the surface. It 
seems probable that aircraft will sooner become danger- 
ous to destroyers and light vessels generally than to the 
large ships of the line. The former are more vulnerable 
and will be less able to protect themselves. 

Even these early developments of naval uses for air- 
craft made it evident that they could not efficiently per- 
form such functions with the fleet unless they could be 
carried with the fleet, not only on long cruises but actu- 
ally in battle, with the result that special types of ships 
have appeared to fill this requirement. The first essential 
of this type is that it should be capable not only of 
launching aeroplanes but also of receiving them back 
after the accomplishment of their mission. With the 
present development of aeroplanes and seaplanes, the only 
practicable method of providing the latter requirement 
is the provision of an enormously large and absolutely 
clear deck upon which the planes can light and be brought 
to rest. The next requirement is that such a vessel shall 
have a speed sufficient to permit it to keep up with the 
main battle fleet when it is going into action. This means 
a speed of 20 to 25 knots. These qualities, together with 
[186] 



APPENDIX 

the need for sufBcIent space to house and care for a con- 
siderable number of planes, together with their personnel, 
have resulted in vessels of 10,000 to 25,000 tons displace- 
ment. To obtain a clear upper deck requires special ar- 
rangements for funnels, navigating bridges, etc., which 
has resulted in the only absolutely new type of naval 
vessels of large size and cost which has appeared as a 
result of the war experience* 



THE ENS 



[187] 



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